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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
   
This case is no stranger to the Idaho Appellate Courts—it’s been here twice before.  In 
those appeals, Idaho Appellate Courts vacated Jonathan Folk’s lewd conduct convictions and 
remanded for new trials, first because the district court erroneously instructed the jury that it 
could convict Mr. Folk for conduct other than the charged oral-to-genital contact, and later 
because the district court erroneously admitted evidence of Mr. Folk’s prior convictions.  The 
third time around, apparently under the impression that it could not secure a lewd conduct 
conviction without relying on Mr. Folk’s prior convictions, the State got creative:  It charged him 
with sexual abuse for tickling T.R.’s belly or feet, or touching his hips.  The allegation that 
Mr. Folk had tickled T.R.’s belly and feet was taken verbatim from Mr. Folk’s testimony at the 
first trial.    
Unsurprisingly, the State’s charging decision was a recipe for disaster.  Even though the 
lewd conduct charge was off the table, the district court admitted evidence of the alleged oral-to-
genital contact that was the basis for the original charge in this case.  It also admitted evidence 
that Mr. Folk had allegedly said he wanted to sexually abuse children, even though neither of 
those pieces of evidence was relevant to the tickling charge.  Throw in the erroneous admission 
of hearsay evidence, the erroneous exclusion of the alleged victim’s prior testimony, and 
multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, and Mr. Folk’s conviction for “sexual abuse by 
tickling” is nothing more than a jury determination that Mr. Folk is a person of bad character.           
In this trial, like the last two, the State resorted to tactics which subverted the rules of 
evidence, turned a blind eye to its ethical duties, violated Mr. Folk’s constitutional rights, and, in 
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turn, has undermined Idaho’s judicial process.  This Court should vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of 
conviction.      
   Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
This case began in 2008, when State charged Mr. Folk with lewd conduct by oral-to-
genital contact, I.C. § 18-1508.  (See R., p.2.)  Those charges arose from allegations by T.R., 
who was five years old at the time, that Mr. Folk had placed his mouth on T.R.’s penis on 
December 25, 2007.  Mr. Folk has consistently maintained his innocence.   
A jury convicted Mr. Folk of lewd conduct, with a persistent violator enhancement, in 
2009.  (R., p.11.)  The Idaho Supreme Court vacated the conviction and remanded for a new trial 
because Mr. Folk had not been able to personally cross-examine T.R. and because the district 
court erroneously instructed the jury that it could convict Mr. Folk for conduct other than the 
alleged oral-to-genital contact.  See State v. Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 336–42 (2011).  Again in 2012, 
a jury found Mr. Folk guilty of lewd conduct and the persistent violator enhancement.  (R., p.22.)  
The Idaho Court of Appeals vacated that conviction and remanded for a third trial because the 
district court had erroneously admitted evidence of Mr. Folk’s prior convictions.  See State v. 
Folk, 157 Idaho 869, 880 (Ct. App. 2014).    
On remand, Mr. Folk represented himself, with the help of standby counsel, 
Mr. Archibald.  Mr. Folk filed a series of pre-trial motions, including a motion to exclude the 
testimony of Blaine Blair.  (R., pp.165–99; see also R., pp. 351–353, 369–74, 553, 556–59, 606–
10, 646; 4/15/15 Tr., p.55, L.17–p.62, L.3; 6/8/15 Tr., p.7, L.7–p.9, L.22, p.17, L.8–p.21, L.8; 
7/13/15 Tr., p.171, L.20–p.172, L.10; 8/315 Tr., p.67, L.23–p.73, L.5; 8/20/15 Tr., p.8, L.12–p.9, 
L.15 (briefing and argument on this issue).)  Mr. Blair, who is a convicted sex offender, was a 
friend of Mr. Folk’s at the time of the alleged crime.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.595, L.2–596, L.20.)  
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Mr. Blair has made inconsistent claims regarding a conversation he allegedly had with 
Mr. Folk—he initially told the main detective on the case, Detective Galbreaith, that Mr. Folk 
had said several times that he did not want to abuse kids.  (Mot. Aug.,1 p.4 (Police Interviews, 
p.7, Ls.14–19 (Mr. Blair telling Detective Galbreaith on January 4, 2008, that Mr. Folk “said to 
me that he was quit anyway . . . [w]as going to quit having contact with children. . .  He told me 
that several times.”)).)  But Mr. Blair later testified that Mr. Folk had said that he did want to 
keep sexually abusing children, that he did not remember having a phone interview with 
Detective Galbreaith, and that he did not tell Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk had said he did 
not want to sexually abuse children.  (Mot. Judicial Notice, Doc. A (1/6/2009 Tr., p.357, Ls.2–10 
(Mr. Blair’s testimony at the first trial)), Doc. B (1/10/2012 Tr., p.443, L.23–p.445, L.17, p.450, 
Ls.11–25, p.455, L.24–p.467, L.12, p.472, L.3–p.473, L.1 (Mr. Blair’s testimony at the second 
trial)).)  Mr. Folk argued that Mr. Blair’s proposed testimony was irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, 
and inadmissible propensity evidence under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b).  (R., p.165; 4/15/15 
Tr., p.56, L.12–p.57, L.9.)   
The State argued that the statement was relevant; that it was not a prior act, crime, or 
wrong, and so Rule 404(b) did not apply; and even if Rule 404(b) did apply, it went to motive 
and intent.2  (R., pp.351–353, 557–59; 4/15/15 Tr., p.57, L.20–p.58, L.6.)  The State suggested 
                                            
1 Mr. Folk asked the court to consider portions of the first and second trial, as well as Mr. Blair’s 
interview with Detective Galbreaith, while deciding this motion.  (R., p.167.)  Mr. Folk has 
included those documents in his motion to augment the record and motion for judicial notice, 
filed concurrently with this brief.     
2 When the State first filed briefing on this issue, it had not yet amended the lewd conduct charge 
to sexual abuse of a minor.  (See R., pp.351–353.)  In that briefing, the State acknowledged that 
intent was not at issue on the lewd conduct charge because Mr. Folk had not asserted that the 
alleged oral-to-genital contact happened, but was an accident.  (R., pp.353–55.)  The State 
argued, however, that the statement would be relevant to intent for a sexual abuse of a minor 
charge.  (Id.)  After the State amended the charge to sexual abuse, it filed a motion requesting 
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that it introduce evidence of Mr. Folk’s alleged statement by asking Mr. Blair a leading question 
which referenced only a future desire to abuse kids, without mentioning Mr. Folk’s prior sex 
offenses.  (R., pp.356–57.)  Mr. Folk, however, countered that the only way to rebut such 
testimony would be to introduce the interview with Detective Galbreaith, in which Mr. Blair said 
that Mr. Folk had told him he did not want to sexually abuse kids.  (R., p.369; see also Mot. 
Aug., p.4 (Police Interview, p.7, Ls.12–19).)  That would necessarily bring in evidence of 
Mr. Folk’s prior offenses.  
After two preliminary and conditional rulings (R., pp.491–95; 8/20/15 Tr., p.9, Ls.8–11), 
the court decided to allow the prosecutor to ask a leading question of Mr. Blair which referenced 
only Mr. Folk’s alleged future intent, but not his past conduct.  The court explained:  
I think it does come in under 404(b), if it comes in in the right manner.  And in 
fairness to [Mr. Folk], I think if it’s suggesting that there was past abuse, I think 
we all agreed that that wasn’t the intent of the question.  The question was 
intended to talk about his intent in the future.   
And typically the court wouldn’t allow a leading question.  But if by doing 
so I’m protecting the defendant’s rights, then I think I’m within my authority 
under the Rules of Evidence to permit that.   
 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.22, L.17–p.23, L.1 (emphasis added); see also Tr. Vol. II, p.587, Ls.10–22.)  
Mr. Folk again raised the following concerns with the court: 
DEFENDANT FOLK:  And the other thing is if we go in on Detective 
Galbreaith’s interview, Blaine Blair says that the defendant said that he wasn’t 
going to have contact with children anymore.  And I have to be able to impeach 
him with this to say that he told Detective Galbreaith the exact opposite.  And I’m 
not sure— 
THE COURT:  Well, they’re not asking him about his interview with 
Detective Galbreaith.  They’re asking him about his visit with the witness, 
Mr. Blaine [sic].  If you want to bring in the fact that there was a prior 
inconsistent statement or something made to Galbreaith, that’s going to be up to 
you, and that’s your call.  I’m assuming you’ve—if it’s within the rules of 
evidence, I’ll let you do it.   
                                                                                                                                            
that the court admit the statement, arguing that intent was then squarely at issue under the 
amended information.  (R., pp.553, 556–59.) 
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. . . .  
DEFENDANT FOLK:  Yes, sir.  But I would be using that statement to—
when Blaine Blair says that there was a conversation of sexual abuse, that I would 
be able to impeach him and say that his actual original statement was that there 
was no intention to have sexual contact.   
THE COURT:  That’s a strategic decision you’re going to have to make.  
Certainly I will allow you to bring that up if you want to open that door.  I’m not 
going to let the State open that door.  But if you want to do that, you can do that.   
MR. ARCHIBALD:  And that’s been part of my concern as his standby 
counsel is how do you cross-examine and how do you lay foundation for the 
context of this statement without bringing in the 404(b) evidence.  
 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.25, L.17–p.27, L.4 (emphasis added).)  The district court was unpersuaded by those 
arguments.  (Id.)   
Meanwhile, the State moved to amend the lewd conduct charge to sexual abuse by having 
sexual contact with a minor under sixteen-years of age, I.C. § 18-1506(1)(b).3  (R., p.440.)  The 
court granted the motion (R., pp.487–89, 513), and the magistrate court found probable cause to 
hold Mr. Folk on the amended charge (R., p.588).  The information alleged that Mr. Folk, “with 
the intent to gratify his lust, passions, or sexual desires, did cause or have sexual contact not 
amounting to lewd conduct with T.R. . . . , who was under age of sixteen years, by tickling the 
stomach and/or feet of T.R. and/or touching the hips of T.R. with his hands.”4  (R., p.673 
                                            
3 I.C. § 18-1506(1)(b) makes it “a felony for any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, with 
the intent to gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the actor, minor child or third party, to 
. . . [c]ause or have sexual contact with such minor child, not amounting to lewd conduct as 
defined in section 18-1508, Idaho Code.”  Idaho Code § 18-1506(3) defines “sexual contact” as 
“any physical contact between such minor child and any person, which is caused by the actor, or 
the actor causing such minor child to have self contact.”   
4 These allegations came directly from Mr. Folk’s prior trial testimony, which Detective 
Galbreaith read to the jury at this trial (Tr. Vol. II, p.642, Ls.8–10 (“[H]e was sitting on the—on 
his bed when I took of his socks.  I was tickling his feet.  I was tickling his belly, his feet.”), and 
Ms. Robert’s anticipated testimony (Tr. Vol. I, p.282, L.5 (Ms. Roberts testifying that, when she 
walked into T.R.’s bedroom, Mr. Folk “had his hands on my son’s hips.”).)  In the interest of 
brevity and clarity, Mr. Folk will refer to the factual basis of the charge—that he tickled the 
stomach or feet of T.R., or touched T.R.’s hips with his hands—as “tickling” throughout this 
brief.  Otherwise, as evident from the prosecutor’s decision to refer to the charged conduct as just 
“touching” throughout the trial, it is unclear whether the “touching” refers to the charged conduct 
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(emphasis added).)  As in the previous informations, the State also alleged that Mr. Folk was a 
persistent violator.  (R., p.674.)   
 In response to the amended charge, Mr. Folk filed a motion to exclude all evidence of the 
alleged oral-to-genital contact, including evidence of T.R.’s nightmare.  (R., pp.564–65, 615–19, 
667.)   He argued that such evidence was no longer relevant, was unfairly prejudicial, and would 
confuse the jury.  (Id.)  The State, on the other hand, contended the evidence was relevant to 
Mr. Folk’s intent, formed part of the complete story of what happened, and was not unfairly 
prejudicial.  (R., pp.635–41; 8/3/15 Tr., p.41, Ls.20–22, p.43, Ls.2–13, p.45, L.44–p.46, L.1.)  
The State explained:  
[T]he State intends to elicit testimony from T.R. that the Defendant placed his 
mouth on T.R.’s penis, only for the purpose of establishing the Defendant’s 
specific intent “to gratify the lust, passions or sexual desire” of the Defendant or 
T.R.  Idaho Code § 18-1506(1).  Testimony regarding oral-to-genital contact 
provides the best evidence to place the Defendant’s sexual contact with T.R. (the 
tickling of T.R.’s stomach/feet and touching of his hip) in perspective.  This 
touching of T.R., which led up the Defendant’s act of placing his mouth on T.R.’s 
penis, was sexually motivated, as shown by the Defendant’s final act upon T.R.’s 
body.  The plain language of I.C. § 18-1506 makes it clear that the Defendant’s 
specific intent surrounding the touching of T.R. is squarely at issue in this case. 
. . . . 
. . . The State intends to submit this evidence for the sole purpose of placing the 
Defendant’s acts of tickling T.R. and touching his hip in perspective as to the 
required specific intent. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
or the uncharged allegation of oral-to-genital contact.   (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. I, p.247, Ls.3–7 (“He’s 
all but admitted . . . almost all of the conduct that the State has alleged; the touching.  So the—
really the only issue for you all to decide is what was his intent when he touched that little boy 
. . . .”); Tr. Vol. II, p.702, Ls.17–19 (“This is a case in which there is one issue for you to decide.  
That single issue is whether the defendant had sexual intent when he touched [T.R.] . . . .”).)   
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(R., p.636.)  The State suggested the court give a limiting instruction indicating that evidence of 
the oral-to-genital contact should be considered only with respect to Mr. Folk’s intent.5  (Id.; 
8/3/15 Tr., p.50, L.14–p.51, L.11.) 
 During the hearings on this motion and in briefing, the court and parties analogized to a 
handful of hypotheticals to determine whether the oral-to-genital contact was actually relevant to 
show Mr. Folk’s intent.  (R., pp.636–37; 8/3/15 Tr., p.44, L.3–p.49, L.8; p.54, L.16–p.55, L.13.)  
The State ultimately suggested that an analogy to a burglary charge was most apt:  
[I]n a prosecution for burglary, should the State be allowed to submit proof of an 
actual theft committed during the burglary?  The answer should be a resounding 
“yes.”  At trial on a burglary charge, the state is required to prove the following 
elements, in relevant part:  “3) the defendant [name] entered [place entered], [and] 
4) at the time entry was made, the defendant had the specific intent to commit 
[theft] [name of other felony].”  Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 511.  There is 
nothing illegal about entering a building.  Similarly, there is nothing illegal about 
tickling or touching a child on the hip.  However, that entry into a building 
becomes an illegal act when the entry is made with the specific intent to commit a 
theft or felony—put another way, the state of mind of the defendant at the time of 
the act is what causes the act to be criminal.  Similarly, that same tickling and 
touching of the hip, that would otherwise not be illegal conduct, becomes an 
illegal act when such touches are motivated by sexual intent.  Thus, proof of 
specific intent in a burglary prosecution is the most exact example for this Court 
look to for guidance. 
 
(R., pp.637–38 (emphasis added) (brackets in original).)  Mr. Archibald, on the other hand, 
suggested that this is like charging a defendant with assault, but then introducing a dead body as 
evidence: 
I think we can all agree that the jury can’t separate those two.  The jury 
can’t convict him of assault without considering that—that there was actually a 
homicide.  And I think the same here, that they want to convict Mr. Folk of 
tickling, but “Just ignore that there was oral-genital contact.  Don’t consider that 
for that purpose.”  
                                            
5 The court gave that instruction:  “Any evidence of oral to genital contact presented at this trial, 
if believed, may only be considered as evidence of the defendant’s intent to gratify his lust, 
passions, or sexual desire.”  (R., p.752.)   
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And that’s why I think this—this amended complaint was—was not well 
taken. . . . . 
 
(8/3/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.2–10.)   
 The Court explained that it believed the evidence was relevant, but was concerned that it 
was unfairly prejudicial:   
I have no doubt that this is highly probative.  It’s also incredibly prejudicial. . . .  
. . . .  
I think this is absolutely a critical decision I have to make.  It may be the 
most critical decision.  It’s a natural consequence of the State’s amendment.  I am 
sure they understood when they made this amendment this type of issue may 
come up.  And as the judge, I don’t get to pick the way the case is charged, I just 
have to make rulings based upon how it’s charged, and so I’m going to have to 
look at this very carefully. 
   
(8/3/15 Tr., p.57, Ls.2–21; see also 8/3/15 Tr., p.51, L.12–p.53, L.13.)   
The court ultimately decided to admit the evidence.  First, it believed the evidence was 
relevant to intent:   
I find the example that was used by the State in their brief of a burglary case in 
which evidence of the felony that had been intended to be committed in a case 
where it was actually committed could be used to further show intent on the 
burglary, I think, is right on point.  And so the Court’s followed that rationale. 
 
(8/20/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.4–9.)  It also explained that the alleged oral-to-genital contact was part of 
the “complete story” and that “the jury is entitled to know exactly what happened.”   (8/20/15 
Tr., p.6, Ls.1–4; see also R., pp.688–89 (relying on State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14 (Ct. App. 
1994).)  Finally, the court concluded that “the evidence is certainly prejudicial, but the Court 
does not believe it is unfairly prejudice [sic].”  (R., p.689.)   
 At trial, the State called six witnesses.  T.R.’s mother, Ms. Roberts, testified that her 
family was living with her grandmother, Ms. Derka, in Idaho Falls on December 25, 2007.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.272, L.1–p.273, L.2.)  That day, Ms. Roberts and her extended family were going 
to have Christmas dinner.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.273, Ls.3–21.)  Mr. Blair, who is part of that extended 
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family, was staying with Ms. Derka for the holidays.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.273, L.16–p.274, L.4.)  He 
lived in Boise at the time, and got a ride to Idaho Falls from Mr. Folk, who is also a distant 
relative.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.273, L.22–p.274, L.23.)  Ms. Roberts testified that she did not want 
Mr. Blair to stay at the house because she had heard he was a sex offender.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.299, 
Ls.5–18.)   
When Mr. Folk went to the house on Christmas day to pick up Mr. Blair and drive back 
to Boise, Christmas dinner was not ready yet and so the two waited at the house.  (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.277, Ls.18–19.)  At some point while Ms. Roberts was in the kitchen cooking, she went into 
the living room to ask where T.R. was.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.277, L.11–p.278, L.1.)  As she approached 
the door to T.R.’s bedroom, Ms. Roberts testified that she heard T.R. say “oh, that’s gross.”  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.280, Ls.1–6.)  When she walked into the bedroom, she saw T.R. laying on the bed 
with his legs opened and Mr. Folk kneeling between them.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.280, Ls.16–20.)  She 
said Mr. Folk had his hands on T.R.’s hips and tickled T.R.’s sides,6 and T.R. started laughing.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.282, Ls.5–8.)  She did not see any signs of sexual activity or arousal, nor did she 
see any clothing out of place.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.379, L.20–p.380, L.2.)  She asked Mr. Folk what 
they were doing, and Mr. Folk and T.R. both said they were just playing.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.281, 
L.19–p.282, L.1.)   
Ms. Roberts and Mr. Folk then helped T.R. clean up his toys.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.286, Ls.1–9.)  
Mr. Folk took T.R.’s legs and hung him upside-down as T.R. picked up the toys and put them 
away.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.287, Ls.1–3.)  After Mr. Folk left the room, Ms. Roberts again asked T.R. 
what they had been doing in the room.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.391, L.17–p.392, L.7, p.393, Ls.2–11, 
                                            
6 The prosecutor impeached Ms. Roberts regarding her testimony that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. 
when she walked in—she testified in a previous trial that Mr. Folk backed away when she 
walked in.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.282, L.16–p.285, L.12.)   
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p.402, L.5–p.403, L.7.)  T.R. said they were just playing, and Ms. Roberts believed him.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.391, Ls.17–p.392, L.7, p.399, Ls.6–8.)  Ms. Roberts testified that T.R. was “clingy” 
and acted strange the rest of the night.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.286, Ls.15–16, p.289, L.22–p.290, L.8.)  
She also testified that T.R. and Mr. Folk played in the living room after they were in the 
bedroom together.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.383, Ls.18–25.)   
 Later that night, Ms. Roberts woke up to T.R. and Ms. Derka coming into her bedroom.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.290, Ls.21–23.)  Ms. Roberts testified that T.R. said he had a nightmare about 
“what that bad guy did to him last night.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.290, L.24–p.294, L.1.)  The next 
morning, she contacted her service coordinator and then the police.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.294, L.10–
p.295, L.23.)         
 T.R. took the stand next.  He did not remember much of what happened that day.  
(See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.410, L.3–p.445, L.21, p.463, L.22–p.488, L.13, p.495, L.1–p.516, 
L.20.)  He testified that he remembered that he played with Mr. Folk, Mr. Folk gave him candy, 
and he went with Mr. Folk into his bedroom.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.414, Ls.7–16.)  He said going into the 
bedroom was Mr. Folk’s idea.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.414, L.24–p.415, L.1.)  When they went into the 
bedroom, T.R. testified that they played around and Mr. Folk tickled him.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.415, 
Ls.4–7.)  T.R. couldn’t remember where he was in the room when the tickling happened, but he 
testified that Mr. Folk tickled him on his chest and the upper half of his body.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.421, 
Ls.9–21.)  T.R. remembered his mom came into the room for a few minutes, at which point 
Mr. Folk said they were just playing.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.415, Ls.15–19.)  After that, T.R. testified that 
he remembered Mr. Folk pulling his pants half way down, and then putting his mouth on T.R.’s 
penis.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.415, Ls.11–14, 20–23.)  T.R. said that the upper part of his body was on the 
bed, his legs hung off the side of the bed, and Mr. Folk knelt in between them, when that 
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happened.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.416, L.10–p.417, L.1.)  T.R. testified he heard a “popping” sound.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.417, L.11–p.418, L.4.)  T.R. said that his mother did not come back into the room 
after that, but that he remembered running to Mr. Blair in the living room.7  (Tr. Vol. I, p.418, 
Ls.8–18.)   
T.R. did not remember what he did after he left the bedroom, whether he had a bad dream 
that night, that the police came over to his house the next morning, or that he later had interviews 
with Detective Galbreaith and Brianna Koster at Help, Inc.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.420, L.13–p.421, L.5, 
p.424, Ls.3–5, p.475, Ls.14–16.)  He did not remember previously testifying that he got snow 
boots for Christmas, his snow boots were wet because he had played outside with them, and 
Mr. Folk helped him take off his snow boots while his mom was standing there.  (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.500, L.11–p.509, L.18.)  He also did not remember previously testifying that he peed in 
Mr. Folk’s mouth and then watched Mr. Folk go outside and puke, or testifying that Mr. Folk ran 
around and chased him outside.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.479, L.14–p.480, L.17.)  He remembered talking 
to his mom the next morning (Tr. Vol. I, p.420, Ls.22–24), but did not remember when he told 
her that Mr. Folk had put his mouth on his penis (Tr. Vol. I, p.423, L.25– p.424, L.2).  T.R. also 
testified at this trial that he had seen a ghost once or twice before, but he did not remember 
seeing a ghost that day.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.478, Ls.10–18.)  After reviewing the Help, Inc., interview, 
T.R acknowledged that he told Ms. Koster that a ghost was at his house on the day Mr. Folk 
allegedly abused him.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.479, Ls.10–13.)  Mr. Folk asked during cross-examination, 
“[t]his is not the first time that you don’t remember a lot of things.  Right?” to which T.R. 
answered, “[y]es.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.443, Ls.9–12.)   
                                            
7 The prosecutor impeached T.R. with his testimony from the second trial, in which he said he 
ran to his mom, but T.R. maintained that he remembered running to Mr. Blair.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.419, 
L.5–p.420, L.6.) 
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 Much of the cross-examination consisted of Mr. Folk trying to refresh T.R.’s memory 
with his prior testimony, and T.R. not remembering.  Of particular importance to this appeal, 
Mr. Folk asked T.R. if he remembered telling Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk had not actually 
touched him, and T.R. said he did not remember.8  (Tr. Vol. I, p.424, Ls.18–21.)  Mr. Folk was 
going to refresh T.R.’s memory with the transcript of that interview, but did not have copies of 
the correct version of the transcript.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.424, L.22–p.426, L.15.)  While the clerk made 
copies, Mr. Folk moved on to a different line of questioning.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.426, L.20–p.427, 
L.3.)  Later on, Mr. Folk returned to the interview with Detective Galbreaith.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.472, 
L.15–p.475, L.9.)  He asked T.R. if he had given any other descriptions of the sound he heard 
when Mr. Folk supposedly put his mouth on his penis and if T.R. ever said Mr. Folk bit his penis 
so hard that it left a mark.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.473, L.16–p.475, L.7.)  T.R. did not remember saying 
that Mr. Folk bit his penis so hard that it left a mark, but he acknowledged that that is what the 
interview transcript said.  (Id.)  Mr. Folk never revisited the subject of whether T.R. had told 
Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk never touched him, and no portions of the interview were 
read into the record.9   
 Mr. Folk also brought out various inconsistencies between T.R.’s testimony at this trial 
versus previous trials or preliminary hearings.  For example:   
                                            
8 The sealed documents in this case include the transcript of Detective Galbreaith’s interview 
with T.R.  (PSI, pp.117–47.)  In the interview, T.R. said that Mr. Folk had put his mouth on 
T.R.’s penis (see PSI, pp.121, 129, 131, 134–43), but T.R. also said, “And he didn’t actually 
touch me.  He actually wanted to—he wanted to play.  And he didn’t want to know—my mom to 
know that I was (inaudible) right here (indicating),” (PSI, p.134 (Interview Tr., p.15, Ls.12–15)).   
9 It appears both the State and district court thought Mr. Folk read portions of the interview 
transcript into the record.  (See Tr. Vol. II, p.628, L.6–p.629.)  Undersigned counsel has searched 
the cross-examination of T.R. for such testimony, but has been unable to find anything to support 
that assertion.   
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 T.R. testified at this trial that Mr. Folk pulled his pants down just enough to expose his 
penis, but he testified at the January 2008 preliminary hearing that Mr. Folk had pulled 
his pants half way down.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.430, L.4–p.435, L.5.) 
 T.R. testified at this trial that the incident took place on his bed, but T.R. testified at the 
first trial that it took place on the floor.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.463, L.22–p.470, L.5.) 
 T.R. testified at this trial that he remembered Mr. Folk putting his mouth on T.R.’s penis 
while T.R. was on his bed, but, during the first trial, T.R. said he did not remember sitting 
on the bed when Mr. Folk was in his room, and also that T.R. did not remember that day 
at all.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.471, L.9–p.472, L.13.)  
 T.R. testified at this trial that his mom came in after he and Mr. Folk were in the room 
and before the alleged incident took place, and also that he did not remember whether she 
came in the room at some point.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.511, L.22–p.515, L.23.)  But he testified at 
the 2015 preliminary hearing, which took place just a month before this trial, that his 
mom was in the room when he and Mr. Folk first went in to his room, she was there for 
ten or fifteen minutes, and then she went to the bathroom.10  (Id.) 
 T.R. testified at this trial that, after the incident, he remembered running to Mr. Blair in 
the living room.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.418, Ls.8–18.)  But at the second trial he testified that he 
remembered playing, laughing, having fun, and picking up toys with Mr. Folk and his 
mother in his bedroom.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.509, L.13–p.511, L.18.) 
 T.R. testified at this trial that he did not really remember when he told his mom about the 
incident, but he thought he told her about it one or two days after it happened.  (Tr. Vol. I, 
p.515, L.24–p.516, L.5.)  At the 2015 preliminary hearing, he testified that he did not 
remember when he told her, but he knew that he did tell her.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.516, Ls.8–16.)   
 Throughout Mr. Folk’s cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly objected to 
Mr. Folk’s use of the T.R.’s prior testimony, which prompted the court to instruct Mr. Folk as 
follows:   
Just one note before we continue, and that has come up several times over 
the last couple of hours.  There is a subtle but important distinction between Rule 
612, which deals with refreshing recollection, and the other rules that deal with 
impeachment with prior inconsistent testimony.  
We’ve been focusing on the former because essentially we have a witness 
saying that he doesn’t remember, he’s being asked if this would refresh his 
recollection.  Generally he’s been saying sometimes that it does, sometimes that it 
                                            
10 This testimony is somewhat unclear, as the next question referred to how long T.R. and 
Mr. Folk were in the room before Ms. Roberts went in, and T.R. acknowledged that the 
transcript said it was a short amount of time.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.513, L.16–p.514, L.20.)   
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doesn’t.  And that’s different than impeaching with prior inconsistent testimony.  
And not remembering isn’t necessarily inconsistent. 
 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.451, L.17–p.452, L.5 (emphasis added).) 
After that, the court sustained various objections in which T.R. said he did not remember 
saying what he read in the transcript, but it was there so he must have said it.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.477, 
Ls.12–16, p.481, Ls.1–7, p.483, Ls.16–19, p.484, Ls.9–13.)  The questions centered on T.R.’s 
snow boots and whether T.R. played in the snow that day.11  (Tr. Vol. I, p.481, L.8–p.488, L.22, 
p.495, L.14–p.496, L.20.)  The court made clear that it sustained the objections “based on the 
refreshment line of questioning.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.477, Ls.12–16, see also Tr. Vol. I, p.481, Ls.1–7, 
p.483, Ls.16–19, p.484, Ls.9–13.)  The court eventually told Mr. Folk:  “I hope you’re listening 
carefully to what the court’s saying.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.484, Ls.15–16.)  The court again said that if 
T.R. denied making the statement, Mr. Folk could submit extrinsic evidence, but “[i]f he doesn’t 
deny it, then you’ve made your point and you get to move on.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.486, Ls.12–14.)   
The court later allowed Mr. Archibald to finish cross examining T.R.  Although T.R. did 
not remember his prior testimony on this subject, he agreed that he had previously testified to 
getting snow boots for Christmas, playing outside, his feet getting wet, and Mr. Folk taking his 
snow boots off while Ms. Roberts was there.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.500, L.7–p.509, L.12.)  T.R. also 
acknowledge that he had testified that Mr. Folk carried him around upside-down to pick up 
blocks, and that T.R. was having fun and laughing while that happened.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.510, L.7–
p.511, L.18.)   
                                            
11 Mr. Folk has consistently maintained that Ms. Roberts asked him to help T.R. take off his 
snow boots because T.R.’s feet were wet, Mr. Folk went with T.R. into his bedroom to get new 
socks, and Mr. Folk knelt in front of T.R. while T.R. was sitting on the bed to help with his 
socks.  (See Tr. Vol. II, p.641, L.24–p.642, L.15 (Detective Galbreaith reading a portion of 
Mr. Folk’s testimony from the first trial).)     
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In response to a handful of sustained objections during his cross-examination, 
Mr. Archibald said “maybe we should just publish the . . . transcript of [T.R.]’s previous 
testimony, since the witness doesn’t remember anything.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.504, Ls.21–24.)  The 
court reiterated, yet again:   
[T]here’s no need to publish it if he doesn’t deny it.  I think the mode of 
impeachment is you just ask him about it.  Right?  Certainly, though, if it’s under 
oath, it could be extrinsic evidence, if he’s denying it.  But I don’t think he’s 
denying it.  If he denies that he made the statement, then extrinsic evidence is 
admissible.  If he doesn’t deny it, then impeachment is complete. 
 
(Tr. Vol. I, p.504, L.25–p.505, L.7 (emphasis added); see also Tr. Vol. I, p.507, Ls.3–5 (“if he 
denies it, confront him with it.  If he still denies it, I’ll let extrinsic evidence in.  If he doesn’t 
deny it, then you’ve made your point.”).)  The court rejected Mr. Archibald’s suggestion that 
“that’s normal impeachment.  But I’ve never had a witness say, ‘I don’t even remember the 
transcript.’”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.507, Ls.6–8.)   
 On redirect examination, the prosecutor began by asking T.R. about the interview with 
Detective Galbreaith:  
Q. . . . And you testified that you didn’t remember anything from the 
. . . interview with Detective Galbreaith.  Right?  
A. Yes.  
Q. Do you recall Mr. Folk asking you if you had stated that he didn’t 
actually touch you?  
A. I remember him asking me that question.  Yes.  
Q. Do you recall whether you disclosed to Detective Galbreaith what 
had happened to you?   
A. No.  
Q. You don’t remember whether you talked to him or not about that? 
A. Yeah.  
Q. I’m sorry.  That was a bad question on my part.  Do you remember 
whether you told Detective Galbreaith what happened to you? 
A. Not really.  
Q. Okay.  So that statement that you said earlier—so when will Mr. 
Folk was asking you about that statement, “He didn’t actually touch me,” do you 
remember that happening?  
A. No.  
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(Tr. Vol. I, p.517, L.12–p.518, L.8.) 
 
The prosecutor also tried to clear up some of T.R.’s confusing testimony.  
T.R. acknowledged he did not remember a lot of things, but that he did remember the bad things 
that happened, like Mr. Folk molesting him.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.530, L.24–p.534, L.13.)  
T.R. acknowledged that he had previously testified that Mr. Folk had not seen his penis, but he 
said he remembered Mr. Folk putting his mouth on his penis.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.523, Ls.4–19.)  
T.R. testified that he did not remember sitting on his bed with Mr. Folk in the room, but that he 
did remember laying on his bed.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.525, L.13–p.526, L.19.)  T.R. acknowledge he 
had previously testified that his mother was in the room when he and Mr. Folk first went to his 
room, but that his mom was not in fact there or he did not remember whether she was there.  
(Tr. Vol. I, p.530, Ls.2–10.)  T.R. testified that his mom was in the room at some point before 
Mr. Folk put his mouth on T.R.’s penis, and that she went to the bathroom after that.12  (Tr. Vol. 
I, p.530, Ls.11–19.)   
T.R.’s grandmother, Ms. Derka, testified next.  She said that Ms. Roberts was helping her 
in the kitchen on Christmas day.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.549, Ls.14–17.)  She did not remember 
Ms. Roberts ever leaving the house, but she did remember when Ms. Roberts went to check on 
T.R.   (Tr. Vol. I, p.549, L.17–p.551, L.23.)  She said Mr. Folk was not in the living room at that 
time.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.553, Ls.3–11.)  After Ms. Roberts came back from checking on T.R., 
Ms. Derka thought she seemed upset.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.556, Ls.2–5.)  Ms. Derka also said T.R. acted 
shy and was “pulling away” from the rest of the family after that.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.558, Ls.9–11.)  
Ms. Derka testified that, later that night, T.R. went into Ms. Derka’s bedroom crying.  (Tr. Vol. I, 
                                            
12 This contradicts Ms. Robert’s testimony—she testified that she walked in and saw Mr. Folk 
kneeling in front of T.R., Mr. Folk left the room after helping him pick up his toys, and 
Ms. Roberts and T.R. stayed in the room for a bit after that.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.280, L.1–p.288, L.15.)   
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p.558, L.25–p.559, L.2.)  He told her that a bad man was chasing him, and Ms. Derka took T.R. 
downstairs to his mother’s bedroom.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.559, Ls.2–20.)   
In addition to testifying to what she remembered from Christmas 2007, Ms. Derka 
testified that she knew Mr. Blair was a sex offender, but that she was not concerned about him 
visiting her house.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.561, L.24–p.562, L.18.)  She did not remember Ms. Roberts 
expressing any concerns about Mr. Blair being around the kids.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.563, Ls.18–21.)   
The State next called Mr. Blair.  He began by telling the jury that he is a registered sex 
offender, but that he now goes to counseling and church and stays away from kids.  (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.590, L.15–p.592, L.20.)  He then discussed his relationship with Mr. Folk and what he 
remembered about the day in question.  Judging from his testimony on those topics, Mr. Blair’s 
memory is fairly described as horrible.   
First, his description of his relationship with Mr. Folk back in 2007 was anything but 
consistent.  During direct examination, he said that Mr. Folk “visited” with him at his house in 
Boise, that he lived there “overnight,” and that he came over for Mr. Blair’s birthday too.  
(Tr. Vol. II, p.595, L.11–p.596, L.10.)  On cross-examination, he said that Mr. Folk was his 
roommate for three or four months, but that “you stayed for a while, and then you didn’t stay all 
very often.  Because you—you lived in Boise.  You went to my mom’s place.  You went to other 
places.  Because I know . . . you didn’t stay there very often,” and would go somewhere else 
during the day.   (Tr. Vol. II, p.609, L.6–p.610, L.2.)  Mr. Blair acknowledged that, at the second 
trial, he testified that Mr. Folk had only lived with him for two days.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.612, Ls.9–
16.)  Then on redirect, he said it was more like a month or two.   (Tr. Vol. II, p.619, Ls.4–6.)   
Mr. Blair’s testimony about the day in question was similarly spotty.  Mr. Blair testified 
that he was at Ms. Derka’s house for Christmas dinner.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.597, Ls.4–11.)  He 
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remembered Mr. Folk arriving at the house, but he could not say why Mr. Folk was there.  
(Tr. Vol. II, p.597, Ls.4–15.)  Eventually, the prosecutor asked whether Mr. Folk was there to 
drive him back to Boise, and Mr. Blair said “yes.”  (Tr. Vol. II, p.597, L.21–p.598, L.4.)  
Mr. Blair then said:  “As I understand, he came inside the doorway, and then he—he just mosed 
around, and then he—then [T.R.] went inside the room and he followed him inside the room.”  
(Tr. Vol. II, p.598, Ls.22–25 (emphasis added).)  Mr. Blair said Mr. Folk and T.R. stayed in the 
room for fifteen to twenty minutes, and then T.R. came back out.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.599, L.17–
p.600, L.9.)  He said he remembered Mr. Folk coming out of the room five or ten minutes after 
that, and then Mr. Folk went outside.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.600, Ls.7–24.)  Mr. Folk and Mr. Blair left 
after getting their car unstuck from the snow.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.600, L.19–p.602, L.12.)  Mr. Blair 
initially said that he and Mr. Folk left in the morning and that they did not stay for Christmas 
dinner, but after looking at his prior testimony, he concluded it must have actually been night 
time.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.601, L.8–p.604, L.25.)     
In response to the prosecutor’s question about what happened when they got back to 
Boise, Mr. Blair said that Mr. Folk left Mr. Blair’s house “the next day,” or “very soon.”  
(Tr. Vol. II, p.605, Ls.1–15.)  Mr. Blair said Mr. Folk went to “some apartment” or that he 
“wanted to go to Africa or something like that . . . I don’t remember too much about what he 
said, because all I know is that he went to Africa.  He said he wanted to go in the state.”  
(Tr. Vol. II, p.605, L.14–p.606, L.1.)  On cross-examination, Mr. Blair acknowledged that he had 
previously told Detective Galbreaith and testified that Mr. Folk packed up and left right when 
they got back to Boise.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.613, L.8–p.614, L.15.)  But Mr. Blair also remembered 
that Mr. Folk helped him get a job in Boise a couple of days after Christmas, and that Mr. Folk 
was in Boise for a week or two after that.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.614, L.16–p.615, L.10.)  On redirect, 
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Mr. Blair said that Mr. Folk was in Boise for a week or two, or a few days, and that he wasn’t 
sure exactly how long it was.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.619, L.7–p.621, L.18.)   
To his credit, Mr. Blair acknowledged he has a bad memory:  “I don’t have a very good 
memory.  I—I have a lost memory time because I don’t know what was the—I don’t have a—it’s 
just not a very good memory.”  (Tr. Vol. II, p.612, Ls.20–23.)  He denied it was related to any 
medications, but that his memory had been bad since he got out of prison in 2000 because of 
stress.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.615, L.11–p.618, L.8.)   
Most importantly to the State’s case, the prosecutor asked Mr. Blair about the statement 
Mr. Folk had supposedly made to him at some point before the alleged incident:  
Q. All right, I’m going to ask you some questions, and I just want you 
to answer yes or no to these questions.  Okay?  Can you do that?  
A.   Yes, I can.  
Q.   Did you and Jonathon ever discuss things?  Yes or no?  
A.   Yes.  
Q.   Ok.  Did you and Jonathon ever share secrets with one another?  
Yes or no? 
A.   Yes. 
Q.   Now again, this is yes or no.  Did the defendant, Jonathon Folk, 
ever say anything to you indicating that he desired to sexually abuse children?  
Yes or no? 
A.   Yes. 
Q.   Ok.  How many times did he express that to you? 
A.   Just once.  
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.596, L.11–p.597, L.3.)  Mr. Folk did not ask about this alleged statement during 
cross-examination.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.607, L.9–p.618, L.14.)   
The State called Detective Galbreaith as its last witness.  Detective Galbreaith was a 
detective with the Idaho Falls Police back in 2007, and he first interviewed T.R. on January 3, 
2008.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.623, Ls.18–25, p.626, Ls.23–25, p.636, Ls.17–20; PSI, pp.117–47; 
Mot. Aug., pp.3–5.)  Over Mr. Folk’s objection, Detective Galbreaith testified that T.R. had told 
Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk had made oral-to-genital contact with him.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.633 
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Ls.9–25.)  Mr. Folk argued this was hearsay and improper bolstering of T.R.’s testimony.  
(Tr. Vol. II, p.627, Ls.1–10, p.628, Ls.16–22, p.630, Ls.22–24.)  The State asserted this was “a 
prior consistent statement with an allegation of fabrication.”  (Tr. Vol. II, p.627, Ls.11–13.)  The 
State also asserted that Mr. Folk had elicited during T.R.’s testimony “a portion of that interview 
in which he said he didn’t actually touch me.  So the issue of whether he made a disclosure in the 
interview I think is fully before the jury.  And that’s—and this witness is the witness to put that 
evidence in.”  (Tr. Vol. II, p.628, L.25–p.629, L.4; see also Tr. Vol. II, p.628, Ls.10–13 (the 
district court stating that Mr. Folk “even had some portions of that interview read, and made 
some points with that”), p.631, Ls.11–13 (the court explaining that “I wouldn’t even be 
considering this if Mr. Folk hadn’t put some of the interview in question.”).)  The court allowed 
the testimony, concluding: 
I think ordinarily it would be hearsay.  However, I think the defense did 
open the door to this.  And I think maintaining a level playing field, inasmuch as 
the victim’s credibility is attached, the state should be allowed to respond by 
producing similar evidence to support the credibility of the victim. 
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.630, Ls.6–11.)   
Detective Galbreaith also testified about his investigation—he interviewed some of 
T.R.’s family members, he did not collect any physical evidence or DNA evidence because “the 
identity of the suspect had already been established,” and he did not have the opportunity to 
collect DNA evidence by the time he became involved in the case.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.635, L.5–
p.638, L.23.)    
Finally, Detective Galbreaith read the following portion of Mr. Folk’s testimony from the 
first trial:   
There is—there’s a lot that happened at the . . . residence that I don’t 
understand why some of them remember some of it and some of them didn’t 
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remember any of it pretty much.  I was really expecting [T.R.] to be my star 
witness, and he couldn’t remember hardly anything.   
At one of the things—and one of the things that he didn’t remember was 
that [Ms. Roberts] had asked me to remove his snow boots.  And they were wet, 
and I removed them.  [Ms. Roberts] was standing a few feet away, three or four 
feet away, where she watched me.  [T.R]’s socks were wet, and I told [T.R] he 
needed some new socks, or some dry socks.  And [T.R] said that they were in my 
room.  And we went to get the socks.   
And he was sitting on the—on his bed when I took of his socks.  I was 
tickling his feet.  I was tickling his belly, his feet.  And he said when I was 
tickling his feet I was pretending like his feet smelled bad after I took off his 
shoes.  And he said, “Ooh, that’s gross.”  Because he didn’t like the fact that I was 
smelling his feet.  I was teasing him that they smelled bad. 
And immediately after that, [Ms. Roberts] walked in.  And she said, 
“What are you doing?”  And I said, “Just playing.”  Because—I didn’t say we 
were just playing a game.  I said “Just playing.”  Because I didn’t want to tell her 
I was just teasing her child, because that’s—kind of sounds like I’m tormenting 
them, you know.  So I said, “We were just playing.”  [T.R] said, “We were just 
playing.”   
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.641, L.18–p.642, L.23.)   
At the close of the State’s case, Mr. Archibald asked for a judgment of acquittal pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal Rule 29 because there was no substantial and competent evidence on the intent 
element of the charge.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.644, L.22–p.645, L.8.)  The court denied the motion:  
[O]n the issue of intent, which was the only issue specifically addressed by the 
defense, certainly from the totality of the circumstances I believe the jury can 
infer the intent.  Certainly there was some evidence.  The court just heard that the 
defendant may have had such intent from witness Blair.  But again there was [sic] 
lots of surrounding circumstances from which it can be inferred, including some 
specific and graphic testimony.  
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.646, Ls.6–14.)   
 
The parties then made their closing arguments.  During its closing, the State made sure to 
stress the fact that Mr. Folk had not asked Mr. Blair about Mr. Folk’s alleged desire to sexually 
abuse children during cross-examination.  The prosecutor said:   
You heard testimony from Blaine Blair, who’s an interesting character.  
This is somebody that the defendant lived with, somebody who he shared secrets 
with, who he talked with. You heard him testify that he saw the defendant go into 
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the bedroom with [T.R.].  You heard him testify that the defendant had stated to 
him a desire to sexually abuse children.  
Mr. Folk had him on the stand, and he steered him pretty good on some 
other stuff.  Didn’t even ask him about that question.  Didn’t ask him a single 
thing.  When was it supposed to happen?  Just, you know, any sort of argument 
about that.   
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.710, L.20–p.711, L.6 (emphasis added).) 
 Further, in rebuttal to Mr. Folk’s closing argument, the prosecutor said:  
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Folk doesn’t want to be found guilty.  And he didn’t 
want to be cross-examined.  He didn’t want an attorney asking him questions.  
The victim of this crime didn’t get that luxury.  And he stood—he sat here and he 
was cross-examined for hours about what had happened.  He’s not the one who’s 
alleged to have done something wrong. . . .   
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.735, Ls.5–11.)   
When the prosecutor finished, the court told the jury:  
One thing that I feel legally bound to address at this time, just to remind 
the jury—I wouldn’t normally do this, but at the beginning of [the Prosecutor’s] 
rebuttal he did mention that the defendant didn’t want to be cross-examined by 
the prosecutor.  I understand why he made that comment.  Certainly it’s a 
response to something that was said by the defendant himself in his closing 
argument.13   
                                            
13 During Mr. Folk’s closing argument, the following exchange took place: 
   
DEFENDANT FOLK:  . . . You may have noticed that I did not testify this 
time.  I have testified before.  
[THE PROSECUTOR]:  Objection.  Your Honor.  I don’t think this is 
proper argument in any sort of way.   
THE COURT:  Well, so far, I don’t find it improper, inasmuch as the 
state’s already produced evidence that he testified before. . . .  But I’m listening 
very intently to make sure he stays within the bounds of the law.”   
DEFENDANT FOLK:  Thank you. 
It is a horror to be charged with a crime and to be innocent.  If I protest too 
much, I will be seen as guilty.  If I get angry, I will be seen as guilty.  If I forget a 
fact under the heat of interrogation, I may be seen as guilty.   
People often do not believe the accused who testifies because they think 
that he may not only be guilty of a crime, but he may take the oath and lie under 
oath to escape conviction.  Nothing I say on the witness stand can ever acquit me.  
I stand before you now as pleading not guilty.  Taking the stand allows the 
prosecutor to make the most innocent person look guilty. . . . 
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But I do need to remind the jury that it’s important that you consider and 
remember instruction 14-A.  And 14-A says that you must not draw any inference 
of guilt from the fact that the defendant has not testified, nor should this fact be 
discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.   
Those are things that we don’t talk about and probably shouldn’t have 
been brought up.  So please disregard any comment to the defendant’s failure to 
testify.   
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.740, Ls.5–22 (emphasis and footnote added).) 
The jury found Mr. Folk guilty of sexual abuse of a child.  (R., p.772).  During the second 
phase of the trial, the district court granted Mr. Folk’s Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion and 
entered a judgment of acquittal on the persistent violator enhancement.  (R., p.801.)  The court 
later sentenced Mr. Folk to a fixed twenty-five year term (R., pp.801–02), and Mr. Folk timely 
appealed (R., pp.804–15). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.732, L.24–p.734, L.1.) 
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ISSUES 
I. Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court 
erroneously admitted Blaine Blair’s white-washed, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial 
testimony regarding Mr. Folk’s alleged desire to sexually abuse children, and that error 
surely contributed to the verdict?  
 
II.  Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court 
erroneously admitted irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading evidence 
of the alleged oral-to-genital contact, and that error surely contributed to the verdict?   
 
III.   Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court 
erroneously excluded T.R.’s prior sworn testimony when T.R. repeatedly testified that he 
did not remember that testimony, and the State cannot prove that error did not contribute 
to the verdict? 
 
IV. Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court 
erroneously admitted Detective Galbreaith’s hearsay testimony that T.R. had told him 
that Mr. Folk had put his mouth on T.R.’s penis, and the State cannot prove that error did 
not contribute to the verdict?   
 
V.   Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the district court 
erroneously denied his Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal after the State 
introduced no evidence that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. or touched T.R.’s hips with the intent 
to gratify his sexual desires?    
 
VI.   Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because the prosecutor 
committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error when, in closing, he asked the 
jury to draw an inference which he knew to be false, told the jury that Mr. Folk “didn’t 
want to be cross-examined,” and said “the victim of this crime didn’t get that luxury,” 
even though “he’s not the one who’s alleged to have done something wrong”?     
 
VII.  Should this Court vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction because, even if these errors 
are individually harmless, the accumulation of the errors deprived Mr. Folk of his 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law and a fair trial? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Conviction Because The District Court Erroneously 
Admitted Blaine Blair’s White-Washed, Irrelevant, And Unfairly Prejudicial Testimony 
Regarding Mr. Folk’s Alleged Desire To Sexually Abuse Children, And That Error Surely 
Contributed To The Verdict  
 
Only relevant evidence, or evidence “having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence,” is admissible.  I.R.E. 401, 402.  But even relevant “evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice.”  I.R.E. 403.  “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an 
improper basis.”  State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2011).   
This Court reviews whether evidence is relevant de novo, while it reviews whether the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.  
State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015).  The abuse of discretion standard considers:  
“(1) whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court 
acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently within the applicable legal 
standards; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason.”  Id. 
The district court erred by admitting Mr. Blair’s testimony about Mr. Folk’s alleged 
desire to sexually abuse children.  Although the court correctly concluded that the statement 
Mr. Folk allegedly made was propensity evidence under Rule 404(b) because it referenced his 
prior bad acts, it incorrectly allowed the State to ask a leading question of Mr. Blair in order to 
avoid that propensity evidence.   First, Mr. Blair’s testimony as admitted was not relevant to any 
issue of material fact in the case, including Mr. Folk’s intent.  Second, even if it were relevant, 
the evidence was only minimally probative given Mr. Blair’s inconsistent statements and 
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extremely poor memory.  The probative value of that evidence was substantially outweighed by 
the risk of unfair prejudice because it left Mr. Folk to choose the lesser of two evils—whether to 
impeach Mr. Blair and thus open the door to the very propensity evidence the court sought to 
avoid when allowing the leading question, or whether to allow Mr. Blair’s very damning 
testimony to go uncontroverted even though Mr. Blair initially made the opposite claim.  
Because the district court’s erroneous admission of Mr. Blair’s testimony surely contributed to 
the verdict, the State cannot meet its burden of showing otherwise.  This Court should vacate 
Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction.   
A. Mr. Blair’s Testimony Regarding Mr. Folk’s Alleged Desire To Continue Sexually 
Abusing Children Was Not Relevant To Any Fact Of Consequence In This Case, 
Including Mr. Folk’s Intent When He Tickled T.R. 
 
The district court admitted Mr. Blair’s statement that Mr. Folk wanted to sexually abuse 
children as evidence that he tickled T.R. “with the intent to gratify [his] lust, passions, or sexual 
desire.”  I.C. § 18-1506(1); R., pp.694–95.  However, that testimony was not relevant to intent.  
Indeed, sexual abuse generally involves some sort of overtly-sexual conduct, not tickling.  And 
while what otherwise appears to be innocent tickling could amount to sexual abuse under 
I.C. § 18-1506(1)(b), there would need to be evidence that the tickling itself was done with the 
intent to satisfy the sexual desires of the defendant.  In other words, had Mr. Folk told Mr. Blair 
that he got sexual gratification from tickling children, that evidence would be relevant to show 
Mr. Folk tickled T.R. with the requisite intent.  A desire to sexually abuse children generally 
doesn’t show that otherwise-innocent tickling was done to gratify Mr. Folk’s sexual desires.    
B. The District Court Should Have Excluded Mr. Blair’s Testimony Because Its Unfair 
Prejudice Substantially Outweighed Whatever Slight Probative Value It Could Have Had  
 
Even if Mr. Blair’s testimony were relevant, it had an extremely low probative value.  As 
made patently clear by Mr. Blair’s testimony, his memory is as disastrous.  (See generally 
 27 
Tr. Vol. II, p.590, L.3–p.622, L.3.)  He said Mr. Folk was a close friend who lived with him for 
months, and at the same time was just an acquaintance who stopped by once and awhile.  
(Tr. Vol. II, p.595, L.11–p.596, L.10, p.609, L.6–p.610, L.2, p.612, Ls.9–16, p.619, Ls.4–6.)  
Before looking at his previous testimony, he could not remember why Mr. Folk went to 
Ms. Derka’s (Tr. Vol. II, p.596, L.4–p.598, L.4), and he thought they left Ms. Derka’s in the 
morning without eating Christmas dinner (Tr. Vol. II, p.601, L.8–p.604, L.25).  At various times, 
he testified that Mr. Folk skipped town as soon as they got back to Boise, stayed in Boise for a 
couple of weeks, and that he went to Africa.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.605, L.1–p.606, L.1, p.614, L.16–
p.615, L.10, p.619, L.7–p.621, L.18.)   
Of particular importance here, the first time Mr. Blair discussed this alleged statement, he 
made the opposite claim from what he said at trial—he told Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk 
had “said to me that he was quit anyway . . . [w]as going to quit having contact with children. . . . 
He told me that several times.”  (Mot. Aug., p.4 (Police Interviews, p.7, Ls.14–19).)   Yet the 
court allowed the prosecutor to ask Mr. Blair a simple “yes” or “no” question about his most 
damning claim and one of the most critical pieces of testimony in the whole trial.  (See Tr. Vol. 
II, p.596, Ls.21–25.)  The probative value of this evidence, even if it were relevant to an issue in 
the case, is minimal.  
The court’s decision to allow this evidence in via a leading question was also unfairly 
prejudicial.  In an effort to avoid the propensity evidence in Mr. Folk’s alleged statement to 
Mr. Blair, the court allowed the State to ask Mr. Blair the following:   
Q.   . . . Did the defendant, Jonathon Folk, ever say anything to you 
indicating that he desired to sexually abuse children?  Yes or no? 
A.   Yes 
Q.   Ok.  How many times did he express that to you? 
A.   Just once.  
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(Tr. Vol. II, p.596, L.21–p.597, L.3.)  The court explained that “typically the court wouldn’t 
allow a leading question.  But if by doing so I’m protecting the defendant’s rights, then I think 
I’m within my authority under the Rules of Evidence to permit that.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.22, L.23–
p.23, L.1 (emphasis added).)   
Ironically, the court’s attempt to protect Mr. Folk’s rights had the opposite effect.  The 
court in fact put the burden on Mr. Folk to choose between the lesser of two evils:  Whether to 
show Mr. Blair had initially told Detective Galbreaith Mr. Folk said exactly the opposite, which 
would necessarily bring in the propensity evidence that the court sought to avoid by allowing the 
leading question in the first place, or whether to let Mr. Blair’s testimony go uncontroverted in 
order to keep the propensity evidence out of the trial.  Contrary to the court’s decision, that was 
not just “a strategic decision” Mr. Folk was going to have to make; it was the direct and 
unavoidable result the district court’s decision to allow the State to introduce a white-washed 
version of otherwise inadmissible evidence.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.26, Ls.20–21.)  Stuck between a rock 
and a hard place, Mr. Folk opted not to impeach Mr. Blair using his previous inconsistent 
statement, in order to avoid opening the door to his prior offenses.  (See Tr. Vol. II, p.607, L.9–
p.618, L.14.)   
To make matters worse, the State, knowing perfectly well why Mr. Folk did not impeach 
Mr. Blair with his prior inconsistent statement, capitalized on Mr. Folk’s silence on that issue 
during closing argument:   
You heard [Mr. Blair] testify that the defendant had stated to him a desire 
to sexually abuse children.  
Mr. Folk had him on the stand, and he steered him pretty good on some 
other stuff.  Didn’t even ask him about that question.  Didn’t ask him a single 
thing.  When was it supposed to happen?  Just, you know, any sort of argument 
about that.   
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(Tr. Vol. II, p.710, L.24–p.711, L.6 (emphasis added).)  The prosecutor thus compounded the 
unfair prejudice by implying that Mr. Blair’s statement was incontrovertible.    
Mr. Blair’s testimony, and the district court’s decision to allow the prosecutor to white-
wash that testimony in order to avoid the propensity evidence, was thus highly and unfairly 
prejudicial to Mr. Folk.  See I.R.E 403.  That prejudice substantially outweighed whatever slight 
probative value it could have had, and thus the court erred by admitting it.  
C.   The State Cannot Show That The Erroneous Admission Of Mr. Blair’s Testimony Is 
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
 
 When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears 
the burden of proving, “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not 
contribute to the verdict obtained.’”  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2008) 
(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)).  The question “is whether the jury 
actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, 
independently of” the inadmissible evidence.  Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991).  “The 
inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict 
would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial 
was surely unattributable to the error.”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) 
(emphasis added).   
Mr. Blair’s testimony about Mr. Folk’s alleged desire to sexually abuse children surely 
contributed to the verdict, and so the State cannot meet its burden of showing otherwise.  See id.  
The charged conduct in this case—tickling T.R.’s belly or feet, or touching his hips—is not 
inherently sexual conduct.  Mr. Blair’s testimony was one of the only two pieces of evidence that 
the jury could have possibly considered to determine whether the otherwise innocent tickling 
was done with the intent to gratify his sexual desires.  Further, as explained above, the prosecutor 
 30 
stressed to the jury that Mr. Folk “steered [Mr. Blair] pretty good on some other stuff,” but 
“didn’t even ask him about” the alleged statement, “didn’t ask him a single thing.”  (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.710, L.20–p.711, L.6.)  If the jury had not already noticed that Mr. Folk did not rebut or 
challenge Mr. Blair’s statement, the prosecutor made sure it did.  The error surely contributed to 
the verdict, and so the State cannot meet its burden of proving otherwise beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  This Court should vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction. 
II. 
 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Conviction Because The District Court Erroneously 
Admitted Irrelevant, Unfairly Prejudicial, Confusing, And Misleading Evidence Of The Alleged 
Oral-To-Genital Contact, And That Error Surely Contributed To The Verdict 
 
Only relevant evidence, or evidence tending to make a fact of consequence to the action 
more or less likely, is admissible.  I.R.E. 401, 402; see also State v. Miller, 157 Idaho 838, 842 
(Ct. App. 2014) (explaining that courts can sometimes admit “evidence of events that are not, 
strictly speaking, part of the charged criminal episode in order to give the jury a ‘complete story’ 
if exclusion of the evidence could result in jury confusion or misleading inferences”) (citation 
omitted).  Similarly, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to show a 
defendant’s criminal propensity. I.R.E. 404(b).  “It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident.”  State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010); I.R.E. 404(b).   
The court may exclude even relevant evidence, however, “if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading 
the jury.”  I.R.E. 403.  “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper 
basis.”  Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 870.  This Court reviews whether evidence is relevant de novo, 
while it reviews whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for 
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an abuse of discretion.  Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 907; see also Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667.  
“[E]vidence of a person’s actions or conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate issue for 
trial, is generally inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b).”   State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 119 
(Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 950 (Ct. App. 1990)). 
Over Mr. Folk’s objection, the court erroneously admitted testimony regarding the oral-
to-genital contact which allegedly happened after Mr. Folk tickled T.R.  (R., pp.688–89 
(concluding the evidence was admissible under Rules 404(b) and 403).)  First, that evidence is 
not relevant to proving the charge, including Mr. Folk’s intent when tickling T.R.  Second, that 
evidence is not necessary to provide the jury with the complete story of what happened that day.  
Finally, even if the alleged oral-to-genital contact were relevant to intent or necessary to give the 
jury the complete story, it is so inflammatory, unfairly prejudicial, confusing, and misleading 
that the court should have excluded it.  Because the testimony about the alleged oral-to-genital 
contact surely contributed to the verdict, the State cannot meet its burden of showing otherwise 
beyond a reasonable doubt.   
A. Evidence Of The Alleged Oral-To-Genital Contact Is Irrelevant To Whether Mr. Folk 
Tickled T.R. With The Intent To Satisfy His Sexual Desires 
 
The State claimed to introduce evidence of the alleged oral-to-genital contact to show 
that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. with the intent to gratify his sexual desires, and the court admitted it 
on that basis.  See R., pp.636–37, 688–89, 752; I.C. § 18-1506(1) (requiring that the defendant 
act “with the intent to gratify [his] lust, passions, or sexual desire”).  On the same logic as 
discussed in Issue I, evidence of the alleged oral-to-genital contact is not relevant to any issue in 
the case, including Mr. Folk’s intent, and is therefore inadmissible.   See I.R.E. 401, 402, 404(b).   
While an act of oral-to-genital contact is inherently an act intended to gratify one’s sexual 
desires, it says nothing about whether other types of touching—here, tickling a child’s belly and 
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feet or touching a child’s hips—are sexually gratifying.  Evidence relevant to that question 
would be testimony that Mr. Folk finds tickling or merely touching children to be sexually 
gratifying.  Instead, the alleged oral-to-genital contact at most shows that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. 
not because the tickling itself satisfied his sexual desires, but because tickling was a means to 
commit the sexually-gratifying act of oral-to-genital contact.   
But, to be clear, touching a child with the objective of committing a later, sexually-
gratifying act is not sexual abuse under I.C. § 18-1506(1)(b).  That statute requires that the 
charged act, here the tickling, itself be done with the intent to sexually gratify the defendant.  
See id.  The analogy to a burglary case, on which State and court relied, highlights this point:  
At trial on a burglary charge, the state is required to prove the following elements, 
in relevant part:  “3) the defendant [name] entered [place entered], [and] 4) at the 
time entry was made, the defendant had the specific intent to commit [theft] 
[name of other felony].”  Idaho Criminal Jury Instruction 511.  There is nothing 
illegal about entering a building.  Similarly, there is nothing illegal about tickling 
or touching a child on the hip.  However, that entry into a building becomes an 
illegal act when the entry is made with the specific intent to commit a theft or 
felony—put another way, the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the act 
is what causes the act to be criminal.  Similarly, that same tickling and touching 
of the hip, that would otherwise not be illegal conduct, becomes an illegal act 
when such touches are motivated by sexual intent.  Thus, proof of specific intent 
in a burglary prosecution is the most exact example for this Court look to for 
guidance. 
 
(R., pp.637–38 (emphasis added); see also 8/20/2015 Tr., p.6, Ls.4–9.)  This reasoning missed 
the forest for the trees.  In a burglary case, whether the defendant committed a theft once inside 
the store is circumstantial evidence to show that, when he entered the store, he had the then-
present intent to commit the future theft.  By analogy, the alleged oral-to-genital contact is 
circumstantial evidence to show that, when Mr. Folk tickled T.R., he had the then-present intent 
to commit the future oral-to-genital contact.  But it does not show that the ticking itself was 
intended to be sexually gratifying, as required by I.C. § 18-1506(1)(b).  The State was thus 
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incorrect in asserting that the tickling “becomes an illegal act when such touches are motivated 
by sexual intent.”  (R., p.638.)   
A better analogy is a defendant who pulls a child into a van and later molests the child.  
The defendant did not commit sexual abuse when pulling the child into the van.  He may have 
had the intent to pull the child into the van so that he could commit a future act which would 
gratify his sexual desires, but that future intent is not the requisite intent under the statute.  
See I.C. § 18-1506(1)(b).  The requisite intent is that the defendant sought sexual gratification by 
the mere act of pulling a child into the van.  In that example, just as here, evidence of a later 
sexual act does not go to show the initial touching was itself intended to be sexually gratifying.  
Evidence of the alleged oral-to-genital contact was irrelevant to the sex abuse charge, and was 
therefore inadmissible.     
B. The Alleged Oral-To-Genital Contact Is Not Necessary To Provide The Jury With The 
Complete Story  
 
The district court also admitted evidence of the alleged oral-to-genital contact after 
concluding that it was part of the “complete story” and that “the jury is entitled to know exactly 
what happened.”  (8/20/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.1–4.)  Evidence of the alleged oral-to-genital contact was 
not necessary, however, to give the jury the complete story of what happened on the day in 
question, and so the court erroneously admitted it on that basis.    
As an initial matter, the court inexplicably believed State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14 
(Ct. App. 1994), supported admitting evidence of the alleged oral-to-genital contact in this case.  
(See R., p.689.)  In Blackstead, the Court of Appeals concluded that the district court properly 
admitted, in Blackstead’s trial for two counts of lewd conduct and one count of infamous crime 
against nature, evidence that the defendant had given drugs to the victim, R.S.  Blackstead, 
126 Idaho at 17–20.  At trial, the district court admitted evidence of two separate instances when 
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Blackstead gave R.S. drugs:  The first was immediately before and after Blackstead molested 
R.S., for which he was convicted of lewd conduct.  Id. at 16, 18.  He got her high on marijuana 
and crank before having sex with her, and then sent her home with a bag of marijuana.  Id. at 16.  
During the second instance of drug use several days later, he gave R.S. and her friend drugs, 
asked the friend whether she was using birth control, and suggested that he and R.S. should “slip 
away for awhile.”  Id.  R.S. declined the invitation.  Id.  Several weeks later, Blackstead 
allegedly molested R.S. a second time.  The jury acquitted Blackstead of lewd conduct and 
infamous crime against nature for that second instance of molestation.  Id. 
The Blackstead Court addressed these instances of uncharged conduct separately.  Id. 
at 17.  Regarding the first instance of drug use, it explained that evidence that the defendant gave 
R.S. drugs immediately before and after having sex with her was “inextricably connected with 
the charged sexual offense”: 
The drug use was part of the immediate interaction between Blackstead and R.S., 
and R.S. asserted that she was under the influence of the drugs when the 
intercourse occurred.  Disclosure of the drug use was necessary in order to give 
the jury a full explanation of how the sexual contact came about.  Indeed, the use 
of drugs could be perceived as part of Blackstead’s method of accomplishing the 
charged crime by using drugs to entice R.S. or to lower her resistance to his 
sexual advances and to afterward reward her for what Blackstead perceived to be 
acquiescence or cooperation. 
 
Id. at 18.   
The Court next discussed the second instance of drug use.  It explained: 
[T]he “complete story principle” is an exception to the Rule 404(b) prohibition of 
other misconduct evidence only where the charged act and the uncharged act are 
so inseparably connected that the jury cannot be given a rational and complete 
presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged misconduct. 
The use of drugs by the defendant, R.S., and [her friend], occurring several days 
after the first charged molestation and several weeks before the second alleged 
molestation, bore no immediate temporal connection to either of the charged acts 
of lewd conduct.  Nor was presentation of this evidence necessary to give the jury 
a complete story of the commission of the crimes. 
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Id. at 19 (emphasis added).  Therefore, the Court concluded that the district court erred by 
concluding it was part of the “complete story.”  Id.  The Court held, however, that this second 
instance of drug use was relevant to Blackstead’s attempt to “groom” the victim—when giving 
the victim drugs the second time, Blackstead attempted to have sex with her, and he was charged 
with lewd conduct and the infamous crime against nature for sexual conduct which occurred 
several weeks later.   Id.  The second instance of drug use was thus “probative of a continuing 
criminal design by Blackstead to cultivate a relationship with R.S., induce her submission to his 
sexual demands and procure her silence through use of drugs.”  Id.   
Although the probative value of this evidence would have been more 
questionable if Blackstead had been tried for only the [first lewd conduct] offense 
. . . , we are persuaded the evidence was relevant to the alleged subsequent 
molestation [leading to the lewd conduct and infamous crime against nature 
charges]; this testimony indicated an on-going scheme by Blackstead to 
accomplish further sexual contacts with R.S. through use of drugs as a means of 
persuasion and inducement.  Stated differently, the evidence showed Blackstead’s 
steps allegedly effectuating a plan to accomplish one of the charged offenses. 
 
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).  Therefore:  “[I]n cases where uncharged criminal acts of the 
defendant were in furtherance of an underlying plan to commit the charged crime, those acts are 
. . . admissible to show the accomplishment of the criminal goal.”  Id. at 19 (emphasis added) 
(citing State v. Alvord, 47 Idaho 162 (1928).   
Here, unlike in Blackstead, the alleged oral-to-genital contact was not “inextricably 
connected” to the tickling such that “that the jury [could not] be given a rational and complete 
presentation of the alleged crime without reference to the uncharged misconduct.”’  Id. at 18–19.  
Mr. Folk did not perform oral sex on T.R. in an attempt to “groom” T.R. so that Mr. Folk could 
tickle him; nor was the alleged oral-to-genital contact probative of a continuing criminal design.  
See id. And while Blackstead would surely apply to this case had the State charged Mr. Folk 
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with the alleged oral-to-genital contact and then attempted to introduce evidence of any 
grooming (such as tickling) as part of the complete story, that is not how the State decided to 
charge this case.   Instead, the State sought an end-run around its burden of proving the lewd 
conduct charge beyond a reasonable doubt by amending the charge to sexual abuse, but still 
using the allegation of oral-to-genital conduct to inflame the jury and secure a conviction.    
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Miller further illustrates this point.  There the district 
court allowed an officer to testify that he had parked away from a house in which an alleged 
assault had taken place because he feared for his own safety.  Miller, 157 Idaho at 841–42.  The 
Court of Appeals held this evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible:    
[T]he officer described events that took place after Miller’s alleged criminal 
conduct had ceased.  Information about where the investigating officers parked 
and why they parked there was entirely irrelevant.  Admission of that testimony 
allowed the jury to hear that the officer feared for his safety because a gun had 
been used in the house, thereby conveying hearsay information received from the 
911 call.  Although courts are sometimes permitted to admit evidence of events 
that are not, strictly speaking, part of the charged criminal episode in order to give 
the jury a “complete story” if exclusion of the evidence could result in jury 
confusion or misleading inferences, e.g., State v. Truman, 150 Idaho 714, 721 
(Ct. App. 2010); Blackstead, 126 Idaho at 18, that principle has no application 
here.  The officer’s testimony about his concern for officer safety was not 
necessary to give the jury a complete story, and its absence would not have left 
any confusing gap in the narrative or resulted in misleading inferences.  
Accordingly, the testimony was irrelevant. 
Miller, 157 Idaho at 842 (first emphasis in original) (internal citations modified).  Here too, the 
alleged oral-to-genital contact was not necessary to give the jury the complete story—it took 
place after the charged crime, “and its absence would not have left any confusing gap in the 
narrative or resulted in misleading inferences.”  Id.  In fact, as discussed below, it was the very 
introduction of this evidence that was likely to mislead the jury.  The evidence was thus 
inadmissible.   
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C. Even If The Alleged Oral-To-Genital Contact Were Relevant To The Crime Charged Or 
Necessary To Provide The Complete Story To The Jury, The Court Should Have 
Excluded It As Unfairly Prejudicial, Confusing, And Misleading  
 
The court summed up the precise problem with this evidence when asking the prosecutor, 
“you don’t think such evidence is so inflammatory that a reasonable jury could just set aside 
evidence of oral sex between an adult and a child and just focus on tickling?”  (8/3/15 Tr., p.51, 
Ls.12–15).  It went on to say that “Rule 403 exists for a reason. . . .  And it exists because we 
know that there is some evidence that’s so inflammatory that human nature won’t allow us to 
disregard it even if a guy in a black robe tells them to do it.”  (8/3/15 Tr., p.53, Ls.8–13; see also 
8/3/15 Tr., p.52, Ls.12–15 (the court stating, “the only reason you want to introduce this 
evidence is because it’s so prejudicial.  I have no question about that.  The issue is whether it’s 
unfairly prejudicial.”), p.41, Ls.3–7 (Mr. Folk arguing that it “is going to be very confusing to 
the jury how to keep that separated and not convict on the lewd conduct charge versus the—just 
the tickling and the alleged hand on the hips”).)  Yet that is exactly what this jury was asked to 
do—convict Mr. Folk of sexual abuse for tickling T.R., while only considering the allegation of 
oral-to-genital contact for the purpose of deciding the intent of that tickling.  This is precisely the 
type of evidence that is confusing, misleading, and unfairly prejudicial because it suggests a 
decision on an improper basis.  See I.R.E. 403; Fordyce, 151 Idaho at 870.  The district court 
erred by admitting evidence of the alleged oral-to-genital contact.   
D.   The State Cannot Show That The Erroneous Admission Of Evidence Of The Alleged 
Oral-To-Genital Contact Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
 
The testimony about the alleged oral-to-genital contact surely contributed to the verdict, 
and so the State will not be able to meet its burden of proving otherwise beyond a reasonable 
doubt.  See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 221;  
see also supra, Section I(C), p.29.  The charged conduct in this case—tickling T.R’s belly and 
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feet or touching his hips—is not inherently sexual conduct.  Evidence of the oral-to-genital 
contact was one of only two pieces of evidence which the jury could have possibly considered to 
determine whether the otherwise-innocent touching was done with the intent to gratify 
Mr. Folk’s sexual desires.  And, despite the fact that the alleged oral-to-genital contact is not 
relevant to intent, the court specifically instructed the jury that it consider this evidence only for 
intent.  (R., p.752 (“Any evidence of oral to genital contact presented at this trial, if believed, 
may only be considered as evidence of the defendant’s intent to gratify his lust, passions, or 
sexual desire.”).)  The court thus mistakenly condoned the jury’s use of this evidence for that 
purpose.   
What’s more, even if the jury could have properly considered the alleged oral-to-genital 
contact with respect to intent, the oral-to-genital contact is so inflammatory, misleading, and 
confusing that it is highly unlikely the jurors considered the evidence for that limited purpose.  
(See 8/3/15 Tr., p.55, Ls.2–10 (Mr. Archibald arguing that “we can all agree that the jury can’t 
separate those two. . . .  that they want to convict Mr. Folk of tickling, but ‘[j]ust ignore that there 
was oral-genital contact.  Don’t consider that for that purpose.’”).)  It is no wonder the court said 
“this is absolutely a critical decision I have to make.  It may be the most critical decision.”  
(8/3/15 Tr., p.57, Ls.14–15; see also 8/3/15 Tr., p.51, L.12–p.53, L.13.)  The error surely 
contributed to the verdict, and thus the State cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that it did 
not.  This Court should vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction. 
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III.   
 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Judgment Of Conviction Because The District Court 
Erroneously Excluded T.R.’s Prior Sworn Testimony After T.R. Repeatedly Testified That He 
Did Not Remember That Testimony, And The State Cannot Prove The Error Did Not Contribute 
To The Verdict 
 
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  I.R.E. 801(c).  
Hearsay is generally not admissible.  I.R.E. 802.  A statement is not hearsay, however, if it was 
given under oath and is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony at trial.  I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A).  
Further, I.R.E. 613(b) provides that, for impeachment purposes, “[e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior 
inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an 
opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to 
interrogate the witness thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require.”  This Court reviews 
the district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of discretion.  State v. 
Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 590 (2013).  
The district court erred by not allowing Mr. Folk to introduce extrinsic evidence of T.R.’s 
prior sworn testimony when T.R. stated, over and over again, that he did not remember issues to 
which he had previously testified.  (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.439, L.2–p.445, L.21, p.463, 
L.22–p.488, L.13, p.495, L.1–p.516, L.20.)  The district court repeatedly told Mr. Folk it would 
only let him introduce T.R.’s prior sworn testimony if T.R. denied making a statement he had 
previously made, but that he could not introduce prior sworn testimony if T.R. merely said he did 
not remember whether he made the statement.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.433, L.19–p.434, L.4 (“You’re 
asking him if he remembers . . . .  Essentially we need to know whether [reading the transcript] 
would cause him to change his answer . . .  And if not, then you need to go on and ask a different 
question in a different way.”), p.451, L.25–p.452, L.5 (“[H]e’s being asked if this would refresh 
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his recollection.  Generally he’s been saying sometimes that it does, sometimes that it doesn’t.  
And that’s different than impeaching with prior inconsistent testimony.  And not remembering 
isn’t necessarily inconsistent.”), p.467, Ls.21–25 (“If he says he doesn’t remember, that’s not the 
same as denying it.  If he looked at it and said, yeah, I may have said that in the first trial but I 
don’t remember now, then you’ve made your point and you have to go on.”), p.486, Ls.12–14 
(“If he denies it, then you can submit extrinsic evidence.  If he doesn’t deny it, then you’ve made 
your point and you get to move on.”), p.505, Ls.5–7 (“If he denies that he made the statement, 
then extrinsic evidence is admissible.  If he doesn’t deny it, then impeachment is complete.”), 
p.507, Ls.3–5 (“[I]f he denies it, confront him with it.  If he still denies it, I’ll let extrinsic 
evidence in.  If he doesn’t deny it, then you’ve made your point.”).14  The district court erred by 
concluding that extrinsic evidence of T.R.’s prior testimony was not admissible unless he denied 
having made the statement, by repeatedly instructing Mr. Folk accordingly, and by refusing to 
admit the testimony.  The prior testimony was admissible for both impeachment and substantive 
purposes under I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) and I.R.E 613(b).  Because the State cannot prove the district 
court’s erroneous exclusion of that testimony surely did not contribute to the verdict, this Court 
should vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction.   
                                            
14 Toward the end of the cross examination, the court sustained various objections “based on the 
refreshment line of questioning.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.477, L.16; see also Tr. Vol. I, p.481, Ls.2–7, 
p.483, Ls.16–19, p.484, Ls.9–16 (“I understand this line of questioning is about refreshment and 
not about impeachment.  So if it’s about refreshment, if he doesn’t remember, then that answer 
stands. . . .  And I hope you are listening carefully to what the court’s saying, Mr. Folk.  
Okay?”).)  Because the district court had already instructed Mr. Folk multiple times that 
Mr. Folk had to move on if T.R. did not remember a specific piece of testimony, and continued 
to do so after sustaining various objections “based on the refreshment line of questioning” 
(see Tr. Vol. I, p.486, Ls.6–14), it is unclear exactly what the district court was getting at with 
those comments.   
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A. T.R.’s Sworn Testimony Was Admissible For Both Impeachment And Substantive 
Purposes Under I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A) And I.R.E 613(b)  
 
A statement is not hearsay if “the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is . . . inconsistent with the 
declarant’s testimony and was given under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial.”  
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A); see also I.R.E. 613(b) (“Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement 
by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny 
the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate the witness thereon, or 
the interests of justice otherwise require.”).  “Testimony by a witness that he or she cannot 
remember is sufficient to complete the foundation for impeachment with a prior inconsistent 
statement.” Preuss v. Thomson, 112 Idaho 169, 171 (Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted)15; see also 
United States v. Dean, 823 F.3d 422, 427 (8th Cir. 2016) (finding the witness’s testimony on 
redirect that she could not remember whether the defendant had a gun was inconsistent with her 
grand jury testimony that he did have a gun because “‘inconsistency is not limited to 
diametrically opposed answers but may be found in evasive answers, inability to recall, silence, 
or changes of position”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Therefore, “[a] 
witness’s declaration that he cannot remember making the purported statement is equivalent to a 
denial.”  Preuss, 112 Idaho at 171. 
                                            
15 Pruess interpreted I.R.C.P. 43(b)(8), which had since been replaced by I.R.E. 613.  Rule 
43(b)(8)) provided: “‘A witness may . . . be impeached by evidence, that he has made, at other 
times, statements inconsistent with his present testimony; but before this can be done, the 
statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of times, places and persons present, 
and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so [be] allowed to explain 
them. . . .’”  Preuss, 112 Idaho at 170 (quoting I.R.C.P. 43(b)(8)).  The Pruess Court noted that 
“[u]nder the particular facts of this case, the rule change alters neither our reasoning nor our 
conclusion.”  Preuss, 112 Idaho at 170 n.2. 
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T.R.’s prior testimony was admissible non-hearsay pursuant to Rule 801(d)(1)(A) and 
was admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 613.  T.R. testified at this trial, he was 
subject to cross-examination concerning the prior testimony, his prior testimony was inconsistent 
with his inability to remember at the current trial, and his previous testimony was given under 
oath and subject to the penalty of perjury.  See I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A); I.R.E. 613(b); Preuss, 
112 Idaho at 170–71.  Therefore, Mr. Folk established the necessary foundation for the 
admission of extrinsic evidence of the testimony.  See Preuss, 112 Idaho at 170–71 (explaining 
that “counsel laid a proper foundation for introduction of the impeaching statements.  He 
presented the circumstances surrounding each statement and he gave the witness an opportunity 
to explain or deny it.  In response to counsel’s questions, the Preusses usually said that they 
could not remember making the prior statements.”).  T.R. repeatedly said he did not remember 
making the statements contained in his testimony from the previous trials and preliminary 
hearings.  (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.439, L.2–p.445, L.21, p.463, L.22–p.488, L.13, p.495, L.1–
p.516, L.20.)  And despite Mr. Folk’s attempt to admit extrinsic evidence of that testimony, the 
court repeatedly instructed him that he could only do so if T.R. denied making the statements, 
not if T.R. merely could not remember.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.433, L.19–p.434, L.4, p.451, L.17–p.452, 
L.5, p.467, L.21–p.468, L.14, p.486, Ls.12–14, p.504, L.25–p.505, L.7, p.506, L.25–p.507, L.5.)  
The court should have admitted T.R.’s sworn testimony as prior inconsistent statements.    
B. The State Cannot Show That The Erroneous Exclusion of T.R.’s Previous Testimony Is 
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
 
The error in this case so pervaded T.R.’s testimony that it is impossible to say how T.R. 
would have testified, or what information the jury would have been able to consider, had the 
district court ruled correctly.  (See generally Tr. Vol. I, p.439, L.2–p.445, L.21, p.463, L.22–
p.488, L.13, p.495, L.1–p.516, L.20.)  Further, the district court’s erroneous rulings and 
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instructions on this issue may have influenced how Mr. Folk cross-examined the remaining three 
witnesses.  The State will thus be unable to meet its burden of proving, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict.  See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279; 
Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 221;  see also supra, Section I(C), p.29.   
IV. 
 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Judgment Of Conviction Because The District Court 
Erroneously Admitted Detective Galbreaith’s Hearsay Testimony That T.R. Told Him That 
Mr. Folk Put His Mouth On T.R.’s Penis, And The State Cannot Prove That Error Did Not 
Contribute To The Verdict 
 
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the 
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  I.R.E. 801(c).  
Hearsay is generally not admissible.  I.R.E. 802.  A statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and 
the statement is . . . consistent with declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or 
implied charge against declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive; or, to 
rehabilitate the declarant’s credibility as a witness when attacked on another ground.”  
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  This Court reviews the district court’s decision to admit or exclude 
evidence for an abuse of discretion.  Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 590. 
The district court erred by admitting Detective Galbreaith’s hearsay testimony that T.R. 
told Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk put his mouth on T.R.’s penis.  As an initial matter, both 
the court and the State mistakenly believed Mr. Folk had either elicited T.R.’s testimony that he 
had told Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk did not touch him or that Mr. Folk had read into the 
record portions of Detective Galbreaith’s interview of T.R. which said as much.  As a result, the 
court incorrectly allowed Detective Galbreaith to introduce that hearsay statement.  Because the 
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State will be unable to show this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this Court 
should vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction.      
A. The District Court Incorrectly Believed Mr. Folk “Opened The Door” To Detective 
Galbreaith’s Hearsay Testimony By Eliciting T.R.’s Testimony About The Interview Or 
Reading Portions Of The Transcript Into The Record 
 
During Mr. Folk’s cross-examination of T.R., T.R. said he did not remember telling 
Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk had not actually touched him.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.424, Ls.18–21 
(Mr. Folk asking “do you remember . . . telling the detective that . . . he didn’t actually touch 
me?” to which T.R. replied “No.”).)  Mr. Folk intended to refresh T.R.’s memory with a 
transcript of that interview, in which T.R. said both that Mr. Folk did and did not touch him, but 
Mr. Folk moved on to another issue while waiting for copies of the transcript.  (Tr. Vol. I, p.424, 
L.18–p.427, L.3.)  He never revisited the subject.  (See Tr. Vol. I, p.472, L.15–p.475, L.9.)  
Therefore, the court was mistaken when it asserted that Mr. Folk “opened the door” to Detective 
Galbreaith’s hearsay testimony by eliciting such testimony from T.R. or reading the interview 
into the record.  (See Tr. Vol. II, p.628, Ls.11–13 (the district court stating that Mr. Folk “even 
had some portions of that interview read, and made some points with that”); see also Tr. Vol. II, 
p.628, L.25–p.629, L.1 (the prosecutor claiming that Mr. Folk had elicited during T.R.’s 
testimony “a portion of that interview in which he said he didn’t actually touch me”).)  T.R.’s 
only testimony on that issue was that T.R. did not remember telling Detective Galbreaith that 
Mr. Folk did not touch him.   
B. Detective Galbreaith’s Testimony That T.R. Told Detective Galbreaith That Mr. Folk Put 
His Mouth On T.R.’s Penis Is Inadmissible Hearsay  
 
  Over Mr. Folk’s hearsay objection, Detective Galbreaith testified that T.R. told him that 
Mr. Folk put his mouth on T.R.’s penis.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.633 Ls.9–25.)  That testimony was 
hearsay because Detective Galbreaith introduced an out-of-court statement made by T.R to prove 
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the truth of the matter asserted—that Mr. Folk put his mouth on T.R.’s penis.  See I.R.E. 801(c).  
Further, the statement was not offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication 
or improper influence or motive, or to rehabilitate T.R.  See I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  As explained 
above, Mr. Folk never introduced any evidence that T.R. had in fact told Detective Galbreaith 
that Mr. Folk did not touch him—he merely asked “do you remember telling the detective that 
. . . he didn’t actually touch me?” to which T.R. responded “No.”  (Tr. Vol. I, p.424, Ls.18–21.)  
Therefore, there was no allegation of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive to rebut, 
nor any attack on T.R.’s credibility to rehabilitate.16  See I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).  Because no 
exception to the hearsay rule applies, the hearsay was inadmissible.  See I.R.E. 802.    
C. The State Cannot Show That The Erroneous Exclusion of T.R.’s Previous Testimony Is 
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt 
 
One of the primary questions for the jury in this case was whether T.R. was telling the 
truth.  In making that determination, the jury likely considered Detective Galbreaith’s testimony 
that T.R. told him that Mr. Folk put his mouth on his penis.  Therefore, the State will be unable 
to prove that the guilty verdict rendered in this case was surely unattributable to the erroneous 
admission of that hearsay testimony.  See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 221;  see also supra, Section I(C), p.29.   
                                            
16 What’s more, the interview transcript shows that T.R. said both that Mr. Folk did and did not 
touch him.  (PSI, pp.117–47.)  Consequently, had Mr. Folk actually put on evidence that T.R. 
had told Detective Galbreaith that Mr. Folk did not touch him, it could not have been to show 
recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.  See I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).   
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V. 
 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Judgment Of Conviction Because The District Court 
Erroneously Denied His Motion For A Judgment Of Acquittal After The State Failed To 
Introduce Any Evidence That Mr. Folk Tickled T.R. With The Intent Of Satisfying His Sexual 
Desire 
 
Idaho Criminal Rule 29(a) provides that the court “shall order the entry of judgment of 
acquittal” on any charged offense if, “after the evidence on either side is closed . . . the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense . . . .”   
That is because the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
guarantees the right to due process, and the U.S. Supreme Court has held that as a 
part of that due process, ‘no person shall be made to suffer the onus of a criminal 
conviction except upon sufficient proof—defined as evidence necessary to 
convince a trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of every 
element of the offense.’”  
  
State v. Eliasen, 158 Idaho 542, 545 (2015) (quoting State v. Goggin, 157 Idaho 1, 5 (2014)).    
 Sexual abuse of a minor requires the State to prove that the defendant had sexual contact 
with the minor, “with the intent to gratify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the actor, minor 
child or third party.”  I.C. § 18-1506.  “Direct evidence as to intent is not required.  A jury may 
infer intent from the commission of acts and the surrounding circumstances.”  State v. Marsh, 
141 Idaho 862, 867 (Ct. App. 2004) (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Matthews, 
124 Idaho 806, 814 (1993).   
When reviewing the district court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion, this Court asks whether, 
“‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Eliasen, 
158 Idaho at 546 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Adamcik, 
152 Idaho 445, 460 (2012)).  “Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it 
and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven.”  Id. (citing 
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State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 712 (2009)).  The Court freely reviews questions of law but 
will not substitute its “judgment for that of the jury on issues of witness credibility, weight of the 
evidence, or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.”  Id. (citing Adamcik, 
152 Idaho at 460). 
The court erroneously denied Mr. Folk’s motion for a judgment of acquittal because there 
was no substantial and competent evidence on the intent element of the charge.  (See Tr. Vol. II, 
p.645, Ls.6–8.)  As explained in Issues I and II above, the only evidence the State introduced to 
purportedly show that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. with the intent to satisfy his sexual desires—
Mr. Blair’s testimony that Mr. Folk had expressed a desire to sexually abuse children and 
evidence of the alleged oral-to-genital contact—in fact had no bearing on whether the act of 
tickling T.R. itself was intended to sexually gratify Mr. Folk.  (See, supra, pp.25–38.)  Just as the 
court mistakenly admitted that evidence because it believed the evidence was relevant to intent, 
it mistakenly concluded the State had presented substantial and competent evidence of intent.17  
(See Tr. Vol. II, p.646, Ls.8–14 (“certainly from the totality of the circumstances I believe the 
jury can infer the intent.  Certainly there was some evidence.  The court just heard that the 
defendant may have had such intent from witness Blair.  But again there was [sic] lots of 
surrounding circumstances from which it can be inferred, including some specific and graphic 
testimony.”).)  The State in fact presented no evidence that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. to satisfy his 
sexual desires, and so no rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Mr. Folk tickled T.R. with that intent.  See Eliasen, 158 Idaho at 546. 
                                            
17 Similarly, had the court ruled correctly and excluded that irrelevant and highly prejudicial 
evidence, no reasonable jury would have found Mr. Folk guilty. 
   
 48 
By the same token, the “surrounding circumstances” could at most lead to the inference 
that, when Mr. Folk tickled T.R., he had the then-present intent to satisfy his sexual desires in the 
future by committing the alleged oral-to-genital contact.  (See Tr. Vol. II, p.646, Ls.6–14.)  In 
other words, a jury could conclude that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. in an effort to get closer to him or 
“groom” him, so that Mr. Folk could satisfy his sexual desire by performing oral sex on T.R.  
(See, supra, pp. 25–38.)  Not a single surrounding circumstance indicated that Mr. Folk intended 
the tickling itself to gratify his sexual desires.  To the contrary, the surrounding circumstances 
indicate the tickling was at best a means to an end.    
Marsh and Matthews highlight the inadequacy of the evidence in this case.  In those 
cases, the Idaho Supreme Court and Court of Appeals affirmed the district courts’ denials of the 
defendants’ Rule 29 motions asserting there was insufficient evidence on the intent element of 
sexual abuse of a minor.  Matthews, 124 Idaho at 813–14; Marsh, 141 Idaho at 867.  The State 
alleged that Matthews put his hand down the back of a child’s pants, and then either touch the 
child’s buttocks or genitals.  Matthews, 124 Idaho at 814.  The Idaho Supreme Court concluded:  
“From these facts, the jury was entitled to infer that, with respect to the touching alleged in the 
information, Matthews acted with the required criminal intent.”  Id.  Similarly, the victim in 
Marsh testified that Marsh put his hand under her clothes and touched her genital area.  Marsh, 
141 Idaho at 867.  Additionally, Marsh admitted to being a “handsy, feely type of guy” who 
fondled people when he drank, and he had been drinking on the night in question.  Id.  The Court 
of Appeals concluded this was sufficient and competent evidence to support a finding that Marsh 
intended to gratify his sexual desires when he touched the child’s genitals.  Id.   
Importantly, the conduct in Matthews and Marsh, unlike the conduct here, was inherently 
sexual.  See Matthews, 124 Idaho at 813–14; Marsh, 141 Idaho at 867.  A juror could reasonably 
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infer from such sexual touching alone that the defendants intended to satisfy their sexual desires.  
See id.  The charged conduct in this case—tickling and touching a child’s hips—is not inherently 
sexual, and thus says nothing about whether Mr. Folk tickled T.R. in order to satisfy his sexual 
desires.  Again, the more reasonable conclusion, considering Mr. Blair’s testimony about 
Mr. Folk’s alleged desire to sexually abuse children and the alleged oral-to-genital contact, 
would be to conclude that the tickling was a means to an end; that Mr. Folk tickled T.R. not to 
satisfy his sexual desires, but so he could have the sexually-gratifying oral-to-genital contact.   
Because there was no substantial and competent evidence on the intent element of the 
charge, the district court erroneously denied Mr. Folk’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.  This 
Court should vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand to the district court with instructions 
that it enter a judgment of acquittal.    
VI. 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Judgment Of Conviction Because The Prosecutor 
Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error When He Asked The Jury To Draw 
An Inference Which He Knew To Be False, Told The Jury That Mr. Folk “Didn’t Want To Be 
Cross-Examined,” And Said “The Victim Of This Crime Didn’t Get That Luxury,” Even Though 
“He’s Not The One Who’s Alleged To Have Done Something Wrong”   
 
The U.S. and Idaho Constitutions provide that no person can be “deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”  U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, § 13.  
Due process requires that criminal trials are fundamentally fair.  Schwartzmiller v. Winters, 
99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978).  Prosecutorial misconduct may so unfairly contaminate a trial that the 
resulting conviction is a denial of due process.  State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App. 
2005) (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)).  For misconduct to amount to a due 
process violation, it must be of sufficient consequence that it denies the defendant his right to a 
fair trial.   Id. (citing Greer, 483 U.S. at 765).  
 50 
The Fifth Amendment gives a criminal defendant the right to remain silent, while the 
Sixth Amendment confers the right to confront the witnesses against him.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
V; see also IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13.  “[A] prosecutor may not directly or indirectly comment 
on a defendant’s invocation of his constitutional right to right to remain silent . . . for the 
purposes of inferring guilt.”  State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing, inter 
alia, State v. McMurry, 143 Idaho 312, 314 (Ct. App. 2006)).  Similarly, a prosecutor may not 
“implicate[ a] defendant’s right to cross-examination and denigrate[ a] defendant’s counsel for 
exercising the right to confront the state’s primary witness.”  State v. Willard, 761 N.E.2d 688, 
694 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).  “[I]t is [also decidedly improper for the government to propound 
inferences that it knows to be false.”  United States v. Blueford, 312 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 
2002); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (a prosecutor’s “improper 
suggestions [and] insinuations . . . are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they 
should properly carry none”).  Finally, “appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury 
through use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible.”  Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87 (citing State v. 
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 769 (1993); State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 898 (1990); State v. 
LaMere, 103 Idaho 839, 844 (1982); State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 168 (1980) (J. Bistline, 
dissenting)).     
When a defendant challenges un-objected to misconduct on appeal, he must persuade the 
Court that the error:  “(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; 
(2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate 
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and 
(3) was not harmless.”  Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.  To show the error was not harmless, the 
defendant has “the burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the 
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outcome of the trial.”  Id. at 226.     
During closing argument in this case, the prosecutor said:  
You heard testimony from Blaine Blair, who’s an interesting character.  
This is somebody that the defendant lived with, somebody why he shared secrets 
with, who he talked with. You heard him testify that he saw the defendant go into 
the bedroom with [T.R.].  You heard him testify that the defendant had stated to 
him a desire to sexually abuse children.  
Mr. Folk had him on the stand, and he steered him pretty good on some 
other stuff.  Didn’t even ask him about that question.  Didn’t ask him a single 
thing.  When was it supposed to happen?  Just, you know, any sort of argument 
about that.   
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.710, L.20–p.711, L.6 (emphasis added).)  On rebuttal, the prosecutor added:   
Ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Folk doesn’t want to be found guilty.  And he didn’t 
want to be cross-examined.  He didn’t want an attorney asking him questions.  
The victim of this crime didn’t get that luxury.  And he stood—he sat here and he 
was cross-examined for hours about what had happened.  He’s not the one who’s 
alleged to have done something wrong. . . .   
 
(Tr. Vol. II, p.735, Ls.5–11.)  These arguments rise to the level of fundamental error.    
A. The Prosecutor’s Statements Amount To Misconduct Which Denied Mr. Folk His Right 
To Due Process   
 
The prosecutor first committed misconduct by asking the jury to infer facts which he 
knew to be false.  See Blueford, 312 F.3d at 968–69 (finding misconduct because the “prosecutor 
was asking the jury to infer one or more facts that he either knew to be false or, at least, could 
not have believed might be true, given that he had specific evidence indicating the contrary”); 
United States v. Udechukwu, 11 F.3d 1101, 1106 (1st Cir. 1993) (explaining that “it is plainly 
improper for a prosecutor to imply reliance on knowledge or evidence not available to the jury.  
It is all the more improper to imply reliance on a fact that the prosecutor knows to be 
untrue. . . .”) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Toney, 599 F.2d 787, 790–91 (6th Cir. 
1979) (concluding the prosecutor’s argument that “the jury ought to disregard Toney’s defense 
because Toney had not produced any evidence to support his claim” was “foul play” because 
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“[a]s he was making the argument, the prosecutor well knew that evidence did exist to 
corroborate Toney’s story”) (emphasis added).  Specifically, the prosecutor implied that, if 
Mr. Folk had any evidence or argument to rebut Mr. Blair’s testimony about Mr. Folk’s alleged 
desire to sexually abuse children, he would have presented that evidence during cross-
examination.  (See Tr. Vol. II, p.710, L.20–p.711, L.6.)  The prosecutor said as much knowing 
full well that Mr. Blair had told Detective Galbreaith, the first time he spoke on the subject just a 
couple of weeks after the alleged incident, that Mr. Folk said he did not want to have contact 
with children.  See Blueford, 312 F.3d at 968–69; Udechukwu, 11 F.3d at 1106; Toney, 599 F.2d 
at 790–91; Mot. Aug., p.4 (Police Interviews, p.7, Ls.14–19 (Mr. Blair telling Detective 
Galbreaith on January 4, 2008, that Mr. Folk “said to me that he was quit anyway . . . [w]as 
going to quit having contact with children. . .  He told me that several times.”)). 
To make matters worse, the prosecutor also knew precisely why Mr. Folk failed to 
impeach Mr. Blair with his prior inconsistent statement—as Mr. Folk argued repeatedly, the only 
way he could do so would be to bring in evidence of his prior offenses.  (See, e.g., Tr. Vol. I, 
p.25, L.17–p.27, L.4.)  The prosecutor thus used a favorable, and patently incorrect, evidentiary 
ruling to imply that Mr. Blair’s testimony was incontrovertible, knowing it was not.  This 
amounts to misconduct.   
The prosecutor next impermissibly commented on Mr. Folk’s Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent when he said that Mr. Folk “didn’t want to be cross-examined.  He didn’t want an 
attorney asking him questions.”  Tr. Vol. II, p.735, Ls.6–8; see Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86.  But the 
prosecutor didn’t stop there.  The prosecutor’s assertion that T.R. “didn’t get that luxury” and 
was “cross-examined for hours about what had happened,” even though “[h]e’s not the one 
who’s alleged to have done something wrong,” impermissibly commented on Mr. Folk’s Sixth 
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Amendment right to confront T.R.  Tr. Vol. II, p.735, Ls.8–11; see Willard, 761 N.E.2d at 694 
(finding the prosecutor committed misconduct by saying “that the complainant was required to 
‘sit and undergo and endure cross-examination at the hands of her assailant’s attorney.’”).   
At the same time, the prosecutor “potentially arous[ed] the sympathies of the jurors for 
the complainant” by “invit[ing] the jury to ‘punish [defendant] for making the victim of the 
crime go through the ordeal of cross-examination, which [defendant] had every right to do.’”  
Willard, 761 N.E.2d at 694 (citing Burns v. Gammon, 173 F.3d 1089, 1095 (8th Cir. 1999)).  The 
prosecutor thus impermissibly appealed to the “emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury” by 
suggesting that they should convict Mr. Folk because he put a faultless child through cross-
examination.  Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87; Tr. Vol. II, p.735, Ls.8–11.   
This misconduct—which asked the jury to draw an inference the prosecutor knew to be 
false, implicated two of Mr. Folk’s protected constitutional rights, and suggested a conviction on 
an improper basis—was of sufficient consequence to violate Mr. Folk’s right to a fair trial and 
due process.  See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 13. 
B. The Misconduct Plainly Exists In The Record 
This prosecutorial misconduct is clear on the face of the record (see Tr. Vol. II, p.710, 
L.20–p.711, L.6, p.735, Ls.5–11), and it was surely not a tactical decision by Mr. Folk to not 
object, see Perry, 150 Idaho at 228.  To be sure, no “reasonable trial strategist” would elect not 
to object to misconduct which asks the jury to draw a false inference regarding a crucial piece of 
testimony, implicates a defendant’s constitutional right to silence and confrontation, and appeals 
to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury.  See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 167–68 
(Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that mere speculation that a defendant strategically failed to object 
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was not sufficient to find the error did not plainly exist).  Putting such damning suggestions to 
the jury could be of no benefit to Mr. Folk.     
C.   The Misconduct Was Not Harmless 
There is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s misconduct at closing affected the 
outcome of the trial.   See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.  The prosecutor’s statements implied that 
Mr. Folk (1) must have told Mr. Blair that he wanted to sexually abuse children because 
otherwise Mr. Folk would have challenged Mr. Blair’s testimony on that subject, (2) must be 
guilty because he did not testify and did not want the prosecutor to cross-examine him, 
(3) should not have cross-examined T.R., even though that was his constitutional right, and 
(4) victimized T.R. not once, but twice, by cross-examining him.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.710, L.20–p.711, 
L.6, p.735, Ls.5–11.)  Each of these impermissible comments on its own would be sufficient to 
affect the outcome in this case.  See, e.g., Toney, 599 F.2d at 791 (“The prosecutor told the jury 
that it should convict because of the absence of evidence which he knew existed.  We have no 
choice but to assume that the jury was persuaded by the prosecutor’s remarks and convicted for 
that reason.”).  The last two comments are especially problematic given that Mr. Folk himself, 
not Mr. Archibald, conducted the majority of T.R.’s cross-examination.  Regardless, the 
combination of the prosecutor’s indiscretions show there is a reasonable possibility this 
misconduct affected the verdict.  See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70–71 (2011)  (explaining 
that the Court will take into consideration whether or not the prosecutor is engaging in a pattern 
of misbehavior). 
To be sure, the court’s “curative instruction,” made in response to the prosecutor’s 
rebuttal argument, was anything but.  (See Tr. Vol. II, p.740, Ls.5–22.)  The court told the jury to 
disregard the prosecutor’s comments on Mr. Folk not testifying and not wanting to be cross-
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examined.  (Id.)  The court made no effort to correct the prosecutor’s suggestion that the jury 
draw an inference he knew to be false or his improper comments on Mr. Folk’s right to confront 
the witnesses against him, nor did the court explain that any sympathy the jury may feel because 
of Mr. Folk’s cross-examination of T.R. could in no way factor into its determination of 
Mr. Folk’s guilt or innocence.  Instead, the court compounded the problem by making it sound as 
though Mr. Folk had invited the misconduct.  (Tr. Vol. II, p.740, Ls.5–22 (“I understand why he 
made that comment.  Certainly it’s a response to something that was said by the defendant 
himself in his closing argument.”).)  This was after the prosecutor objected to part of Mr. Folk’s 
closing argument, and the court overruled the objection saying that it would listen “very intently 
to make sure he stays within the bounds of the law.”  (Tr. Vol. II, p.733. Ls.3–12.)  Had Mr. Folk 
stepped out of those bounds, the court should have said so or the prosecutor should have renewed 
his objection.  The failure to do so should not give the prosecutor a free pass to commit 
misconduct.   
The prosecutor committed misconduct by asking the jury to draw inferences which he 
knew to be false, commenting on Mr. Folk’s constitutional right to remain silent and to confront 
the witnesses against him, and by appealing to the jury’s emotions, passions, and prejudices.  
This misconduct is clear on the record, and there is a reasonable possibility that it affected the 
outcome.  This Court should therefore vacate Mr. Folk’s judgment of conviction.   
VII.  
 
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Folk’s Judgment Of Conviction Because, Even If These Errors 
Are Individually Harmless, The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived Mr. Folk Of His Fourteenth 
Amendment Right To Due Process Of Law And A Fair Trial 
 
Errors which individually might be harmless can require reversal if the accumulation of 
those errors show the defendant was denied a fair trial and thus due process.  State v. Paciorek, 
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137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994).  In order to 
find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the 
alleged errors, and then conclude that the aggregate of those errors denied the defendant a fair 
trial.  State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999); see also Toney, 599 F.2d at 789 (“it 
was the trial court’s erroneous exclusion of the King statement from evidence, coupled with a 
highly questionable attempt by the prosecutor to capitalize on this error, that requires reversal.”).   
 The district court’s errors in this case, even if individually harmless, together deprived 
him of a fair trial.  His arguments in support of this claim are found in Issues I–IV and VI above. 
CONCLUSION 
 Mr. Folk respectfully requests that this Court vacated his judgment of conviction and 
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.  
 DATED this 8th day of November, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      MAYA P. WALDRON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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